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In 2003, Maurice Clarett's promising football career at
The Ohio State University was cut short for alleged violations
of National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") regula-
tions.! He then petitioned, unsuccessfully, to begin his pro-
fessional football career in the National Football League
("NFL").2 Although the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit promptly upheld the NFL's decision to
deny Clarett's petition to join the league,3 the court's analysis
in reaching that decision merits consideration. While federal
antitrust laws generally prevent the NFL, as an entity, from
barring Clarett's entry to the league without sufficient pro-
competitive justification, federal labor laws nonetheless
shield the NFL's actions from that antitrust scrutiny so long
as they are taken in the presence of good faith, arms-length
collective bargaining.4
The Second Circuit's particular application of federal la-
bor and antitrust laws requires an examination because its
application of those laws disproportionately favors federal
labor policies. In certain circumstances, federal labor policies
counsel against subjecting an action to antitrust scrutiny,5
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A. Political Science, Tulane University.
1. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
2. Id. at 126.
3. Id. at 143.
4. Id at 130; see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2000); Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 17 (2000); 29 U.S.C § 52 (2000); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (2000).
5. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941)). "It has long been recognized that in order to accommodate the col-
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while in other circumstances, permitting antitrust scrutiny
would not significantly interfere with respecting federal labor
policy.6 As this comment will conclude, the Second Circuit's
denial of Clarett's entry into the NFL is an unfortunate, but
nonetheless typical, result of an approach that fails to afford
proper weight to federal antitrust law and policy in balancing
those interests against applicable federal labor law and pol-
icy.
Section II of this comment traces the development of the
United States' labor and antitrust laws and their underlying
economic and legal theories.7 It then traverses how a number
of courts have applied those laws in the professional sports
and other contexts.8 Using the case of Maurice Clarett as a
guide, this comment reexamines the merits of the various ap-
proaches courts have applied in resolving questions that arise
at the intersection of federal labor and antitrust laws. 9 Sec-
tion III identifies the potential problem created by applying
the Second Circuit's approach to a case like Clarett v. Na-
tional Football League ("Clarett). ° Section IV analyzes and
critiques the Second Circuit's opinion, showing how it devi-
ates from Supreme Court and other appellate court prece-
dent.' Section V proposes an approach different from the
Second Circuit's and similar to that used by the Eighth Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court. 2 Finally, section VI concludes
that Clarett was incorrectly decided, and that, without cor-
rection, could set dangerous precedent allowing parties to col-
lective bargaining relationships to escape the mandates of
federal antitrust law. 13
lective bargaining process, certain concerted activity among and between labor
and employers must be held to be beyond the reach of the antitrust laws." Id.
6. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). "[A]n agreement
among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances
from the collective-bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust interven-
tion would not significantly interfere with [the collective bargaining] process."
Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
9. See discussion infra Part II.D-E.
10. Clarett, 369 F.3d 124; see discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. See discussion infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
In passing the Sherman Act 14 and the Clayton Act, 5 Con-
gress designed the statutory structure for antitrust law. This
structure, with subsequent amendments, remains largely in-
tact. 6 Despite the statutes' longevity, courts struggled to ap-
ply federal antitrust laws in a manner consistent with federal
labor policies." In response, Congress enacted the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in 1935.18 The NLRA envi-
sioned the formation of labor unions that would engage in
meaningful collective bargaining 9 with employers to formu-
late the details of the labor and employment contracts be-
tween them.20 After 1935, courts were left with the clear indi-
cation from Congress that it had intended to promote mean-
ingful collective bargaining by exempting such efforts from
the application of otherwise applicable antitrust laws.2" How-
ever, courts were left to determine on their own when and
how to interpret the limitations of that exemption.
The Sherman Act prohibits "[e] very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.... 22  However, the courts have inter-
preted the Sherman Act to limit only those contracts or com-
14. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2000). The Sherman Act was passed in
1890 to combat the growing number of labor unions, and in response to the
then-prevailing view that labor unions negatively impacted competition. DOUG-
LAS E. RAY, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAw 10 (Matthew Bender 1999).
15. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). The Clayton Act was passed in 1914,
at the urging of labor unions, as a means to limit the impact of the Sherman Act
on union activity. Ray, supra note 14, at 10.
16. Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Bal-
ancing, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 705 (1986).
17. The courts' difficulties in applying federal antitrust laws came, at first,
as a result of their apparent distaste for labor unions. RAY, supra note 14, at 10.
18. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2000); see also Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (2000). The Norris-LaGuardia Act
was passed in 1934 to give further protection to labor unions by limiting the
power of courts to intervene in labor disputes.
19. "Collective bargaining" includes, among other acts, the efforts between
employers and designated employee representatives to discuss grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and conditions of work. 29
U.S.C. § 152(5).
20. The parties are obligated by the terms of the NLRA to collectively bar-
gain in good faith. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3).
21. See 29 U.S.C § 171.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
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binations that: 1) have a restraining effect on interstate trade
or commerce; 2) represent unreasonable or arbitrary re-
straints; and, 3) are not exempt from the antitrust laws. 3
Consequently, the Sherman Act does not limit with whom a
private entity may choose to deal,24 nor does it guarantee that
entirely free competition is always protected.25 Instead, the
Sherman Act is a declaration of congressional intent that the
right to conduct business is not unqualified. 6
A. Judicial Interpretations of the Sherman Act
For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has
struggled to identify exactly what limitations the Sherman
Act imposes on the right to conduct business. 7 In its earliest
interpretations of the Sherman Act, the Court construed it "in
the light of reason" to "prohibit only [those] contracts and
combinations which amount to an unreasonable or undue re-
straint of trade in interstate commerce."28  The Court thus
undertook to regulate industry, taking an active role rather
than simply prohibiting those contracts or acts that the com-
mon law had deemed undue restraints on trade.29 In doing so,
the Court looked at "new times and economic conditions" to
determine which contracts or actions were unreasonable or
were undue burdens on trade at the time."° These considera-
tions led the Court to adopt a balancing approach called the
"rule of reason," in which it struck contracts or actions with
unduly or unreasonably anticompetitive effects that out-
weighed their proffered justifications."
23. Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, 495 (2003).
24. Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 124 S. Ct. 872, 879
(2004) (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
25. Id. at 883 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972)).
26. Id. at 879 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 601 (1985)).
27. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 601; Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S.
341 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
28. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 58.
29. Id.
30. Id at 59-60. Among the factors the Court examined were a "practical
conception" of the current state of the law on restraint of trade, new forms of
contracts, and combinations that had recently evolved based on current eco-
nomic conditions. Id.
31. See id; see also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
1049, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Vol: 45
2004 ANTITRUSTAND LABOR LA W
Standard Oil Company v. United StateP ("Standard
Oil') illustrates both the "rule of reason" and the difficulty
the Court has had in applying it.33 The United States brought
suit against Standard Oil and other oil companies, asserting
that the defendants had conspired to fix the price of crude
and refined oil, and that those actions amounted to violations
of federal antitrust laws."4 The Court interpreted section 1 of
the Sherman Act 5 as if it "contained the word 'unreasonable'
or the word 'undue."'36 In determining whether the defen-
dants' practices were unreasonable or unduly anticompeti-
tive, the Court considered both the common law and the new
times and economic conditions." Although the Court's review
of then-current economic norms as well as established com-
mon law principles provided a solid foundation for its "rule of
reason" review, its ultimate decision in Standard Oil instead
rested upon a simple judicial balancing between the proffered
efficiency justifications and the restrictive capacity of the
challenged actions." The problem with such an approach, as
Justice Harlan noted in his dissent, is the "obvious danger"
that the Court's balancing invites the oft-feared result of "ju-
dicial legislation."39
32. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 1.
33. See generally id. at 47 ("Both as to the law and as to the facts, the op-
posing contentions pressed in the argument are numerous, and in all their as-
pects are so irreconcilable that it is difficult to reduce them to some fundamen-
tal generalization, which, by being disposed of, would decide them all.").
34. Id. at 32.
35. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, by its language, prohibits "[e] very con-
tract, combination... or conspiracy." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
36. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 99 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, by
its "rule of reason" approach, the Court applied section 1 only to prohibit those
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that it found to place unreasonable or
undue burdens on trade. Id. at 87.
37. Id, at 59-60. Among common law principles considered by the Court
were the English views on the law of restraint of trade. Id. "New times and
economic conditions," as used by the Court, required it to look at the current
state of the market in order to evaluate whether a challenged action had, based
on changes in the marketplace, become more or less anticompetitive. Id.
38. Id. The Court found the defendants' actions to be so anticompetitive as
to raise a presumption of their intention to restrain trade and monopolize the
market for crude oil. Id. Because the defendants were unable to rebut this
presumption, the Court refused to accept the defendants' justifications for their
actions. Id. at 74-76.
39. Id. at 100 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his opinion, Justice Harlan feared
that the Court had improperly adhered to existing precedents and had set a
dangerous course in adopting a "rule of reason" approach. Id. at 104-05. The
primary problem with such an approach is that it would likely lead to the Court
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To prevent overtly subjective results and the usurping of
congressional authority, some courts thereafter rejected the
Standard Oil balancing approach in favor of a per se rule as a
"judicial shortcut."41 In hopes of standardizing and simplify-
ing the process of review, these courts attempted to identify a
specific number of actions or contracts, such as group boy-
cotts, 4'1 that were considered to be so blatantly anticompeti-
tive as to amount to per se violations of federal antitrust
laws.4 '2 But the per se approach also proved to be of limited
utility, as courts frequently found reasons to accept defen-
dants' justifications for their anticompetitive actions that
were based on little more than the "policy of another stat-
ute."43 Under the per se approach, challenged acts were in fact
readily upheld based solely on policy-driven arguments and a
desire to promote judicial efficiency,' whereas under a Stan-
dard Oil balancing approach, similar actions would likely
have been conclusively "undue or unreasonable" restraints on
trade by virtue of their obvious anticompetitive nature.45
While there is some support that the per se approach is
now a dead letter altogether,46 at least one scholar has con-
replacing its considered judgment for that of Congress. Id.
40. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
41. Group boycotts, also known as refusals to deal, are concerted action(s) of
an entity that have the effect of limiting access of certain individuals to that
entity or the services it provides. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
42. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (finding group boycott as per se viola-
tion); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (listing per se violations as including: price fixing, division of
markets, group boycotts and tying arrangements).
43. Silver, 373 U.S. at 348-49 (finding that the defendant acted in compli-
ance with the policies underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, namely
to eliminate restraints on competition, and that in light of that was entitled to a
greater degree of protection from the Sherman Act).
44. See, e.g., id. at 341. In Silver, the Court considered the competing poli-
cies underlying the Sherman Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Id. The
Securities Exchange Act presented a unique problem to the Court because it
allowed for self-regulation by securities exchanges, and therefore, at least in
theory, also allowed for a degree of anticompetitive behavior that would other-
wise violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 349.
45. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (finding that in many cases, anticom-
petitive actions would likely fail either a "rule of reason" or a per se approach,
but advocating the per se approach as being generally more efficient).
46. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (deciding
it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to a case involving an industry
in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to
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cluded that the reluctance of the courts to apply a per se ap-
proach in the antitrust context is simply part of a larger judi-
cial trend away from such out-of-hand rejections.47 As it ap-
plies in the antitrust context, this judicial trend recognizes
the growing number of business-related acts that may be jus-
tified as necessary and advantageous to competition and that,
therefore, merit more substantive judicial review." The trend
also recognizes the general sentiment of many commentators
that per se treatment is simply inappropriate in the antitrust
context.49
Despite this sentiment, the labor context, concerted re-
fusals to deal 50 on the part of an employer have often been
held to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.5 Refusals to
deal not only affect the victims of the boycott individually, but
also detract from the overall vigor of free competition within
the relevant market." While refusals to deal have often been
held to be per se violations,53 such holdings are not without
exception and limitation.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange ("Silve), the
Court noted that refusals to deal that would otherwise consti-
tute per se violations of the Sherman Act might be permissi-
ble when clearly supported by "justification[s] derived from
the policy of another statute or otherwise."55 In Silver, a
be available at all).
47. Marks, supra note 16, at 713-14 (claiming that the judicial "shortcut"
known as the per se approach is now disfavored in the antitrust context and
that the "rule of reason" approach, which instead requires the fact finder to
weigh circumstances of the case to determine whether activity imposes an un-
reasonable restraint on competition, is now more commonly used to allow for a
more considered review of a challenged action).
48. Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field
Displace Competition in the Marketplace? 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 285 (1993).
49. See Marks, supra note 16, at 758.
50. Refusals to deal, or group boycotts, are concerted action(s) of an entity
which have the effect of limiting access of certain individuals to that entity or
the services it provides. Kior's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 212. In the sports context, cer-
tain restraints appear on their face similar to concerted refusals to deal such as
agreements among teams allocating initial rights to bargain with players, usu-
ally known as "player drafts," and subsequent limitations on the right of players
freely to move from one team to another. Bauer, supra note 48, at 277.
51. Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 212.
52. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1061
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
53. Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 212.
54. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
55. Id. at 348-49.
2004
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group of securities traders complained that the New York
Stock Exhange had violated the Sherman Act by limiting
their access to certain services necessary for them to compete
in the sale of over-the-counter securities.56 However, instead
of holding the Exchange's actions to be per se violations of the
Sherman Act as constituting an illegal group boycott, the Sil-
ver Court instead upheld the Exchange's actions by creating a
new "rule of reason" exception to the per se rule of illegality
generally applied to group boycotts.57
To uphold a group boycott under the new "rule of reason"
exception, the Court required four conditions to be satisfied:
1) a legislative mandate existed on the subject matter; 2) the
challenged action was consistent with the policies underlying
the legislative mandate; 3) the restriction created by the
group boycott was no more extensive than necessary; and fi-
nally, 4) adequate safeguards (i.e., judicial review) existed to
prevent arbitrary enforcement.58
In applying the test, the Court first noted the presence
and importance of the Securities Exchange Act, and, more
specifically, the fact that its presence indicated a congres-
sional intent to allow for self-regulation of the securities trad-
ing.59 The Court next found that the action challenged by the
petitioners was consistent with the original policies underly-
ing the reasons for Congress's granting over-the-counter se-
curity traders self-regulation. ° The Court then decided that
the respondents' actions met the remaining two parts of its
four-part inquiry: the actions were no more extensive than
necessary, and the respondents provided adequate safeguards
against arbitrary enforcement of the restrictions." After con-
sidering these four prongs, the Court determined that the Ex-
change's actions warranted a "rule of reason" exception to the
per se rule of illegality otherwise applicable to refusals to
56. Id. at 347. Unlike listed securities, such as those listed on general trade
exchanges like the NYSE and NASDAQ, there is no central trading place for
securities that are traded over-the-counter. Id. at 348-49.
57. Id. at 347.
58. Seeid.at341.
59. Id at 351-52. "It was ... the combination of the enormous growth in
the power and impact of exchanges in our economy, and their inability and un-
willingness to curb abuses which had increasingly grave implications because of
this growth, that moved Congress to enact the Securities Exchange Act." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
60. See Silver, 373 U.S. at 359-61.
61. See generally id. at 341.
Vol: 45162
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deal."2
Thus, despite attempts by other courts to avoid the prob-
lems of subjectivity and judicial legislation, the Silver Court's
four-part "rule of reason" test reinstituted a heightened judi-
cial role in evaluating refusals to deal or group boycotts.
B. The Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to the NFL
The NFL is a private entity that enjoys a monopoly on
professional football in the United States.63 With the excep-
tion of a limited antitrust exemption allowing for the forma-
tion of the current league system,' the actions of the NFL are
otherwise subject to antitrust scrutiny.' While Major League
Baseball enjoys full immunity from antitrust review, four leg-
islative attempts to extend comparable immunity to the ac-
tions of the NFL have been rebuffed.66 Despite the fact that
the Court itself has previously found the rationale underlying
baseball's complete antitrust immunity to be "extremely du-
bious," "inconsistent," and "illogical," 7 it nonetheless recog-
nized that more harm than good would result from removing
the immunity.'
The NFL's actions, although not entirely immune from
antitrust scrutiny, may nonetheless be exempt from that
scrutiny provided that certain conditions are met.69 Since
1968, the National Football League Players Association
("NFLPA") has represented NFL players in their collective
bargaining efforts with the NFL's Management Council
62. DenverRockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064 (citing Silver, 373 U.S. at 348-49).
63. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 783 (3d Cir. 1983).
64. Id. at 775 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (amended in 1966)). This sec-
tion allowed the formation of the current single-league NFL system from two
previously separate leagues, the NFL and the AFL, without imposing on the
newly formed league the otherwise applicable provisions of federal antitrust
law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
65. See, e.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
66. Id. at 450 n.7 (citing H.R. 4229, 4230, 4231 and S. 1526, 82d Cong.
(1951) as failed attempts to petition a congressionally enforced exemption to
federal antitrust laws, similar in nature to what is provided to Major League
Baseball).
67. Salerno v. American League, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970), cited in
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 268 n.9 (1972); see also Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452.
68. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (finding that considerations of stare decisis
and the "unique characteristics and needs" of baseball led the Court to reach
this conclusion).
69. Brown, 518 U.S. at 234.
2004
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("NFLMC").'0 The NFLPA is recognized by the National La-
bor Relations Board ("NLRB") as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all NFL players.7' It acts on the players' be-
half in negotiating the terms of the league's Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement ("CBA") with NFL owners and other
league officials of the NFLMC. 7' To the extent that the
NFLPA represents the players in bona-fide, arms-length col-
lective bargaining73 efforts with the NFLMC, the agreed upon
terms of the CBA are generally exempt from antitrust scru-
tiny by operation of the non-statutory labor exemption. 4
C. The Non-statutory Labor Exemption and Early
Interpretations by the Supreme Court
The non-statutory labor exemption ("Exemption") is a ju-
dicial creation, derived from the Supreme Court's under-
standing of federal labor policy and, more specifically, from
the Court's view that one of the central goals of that policy is
to promote collective bargaining efforts.7' The exemption pre-
70. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 126-27 (2d Cir. 2004) (identifying the NFLPA
as the NFL players' exclusive bargaining representative and the NFLMC as the
bargaining unit representing the owners of the NFL's teams; generally, the
NFL and the NFLMC are interchangeable); see also Complaint of Maurice
Clarett, (No. 03-CV-7441), http://sskrplaw.com/nfl/clarettvnfl.pdf (last visited
Oct. 2, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
71. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976). The NLRB promotes
and encourages the formation of employee organizations for the purpose of en-
gaging in collective bargaining efforts with employers on behalf of other em-
ployees. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
72. Brown, 518 U.S. at 234.
73. The NLRA requires that the parties to a collective bargaining relation-
ship "collectively bargain in good faith." See National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d). It defines good faith collective bargaining to mean "the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith." Id. (a)(5). The
Eighth Circuit has interpreted the requirement of § 158(d) to require evidence
that the parties have relatively equal bargaining power, that the terms of their
agreement are agreed upon by each party, that the terms benefit both parties,
and, finally, that, if a term is unilaterally imposed, that at least it was shown to
be a focal point of bargaining efforts prior to that time. Mackey, 543 F.2d at
615.
74. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. "As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to require groups of employers and employees to bargain to-
gether, but at the same time to forbid them to make among themselves or with
each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary
to make the process work or its results mutually acceptable." Brown, 518 U.S.
at 237.
75. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-36. In enacting the labor statutes in the 1930s,
Congress "hoped to prevent judicial use of antitrust law to resolve labor dis-
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vents the success of an otherwise valid antitrust cause of ac-
tion where its success would mean subjecting collective bar-
gaining efforts to a court's antitrust scrutiny. 6 In doing so,
the exemption applies to any employment relationship char-
acterized by collective bargaining and, therefore, furthers
Congress's primary objective for federal labor policy.7 While
the Court has succeeded in broadly defining the scope and
purpose of the exemption generally, it has struggled to define
both the specific terms and the approaches to its application."
1. The Intimately Related/Jewel Tea Approach
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. ("Jewel
Ted') involved a collective bargaining agreement between
Chicago-area butchers and a trade association that repre-
sented Chicago's meat retailers.79 Jewel Tea, a retailer, ob-
jected to the association's acquiescence to the butchers' de-
mand that meat counters in stores only operate from 9 a.m.
until 6 p.m. each day.80 In finding the restriction exempt from
antitrust scrutiny, the Court explicitly stated that its decision
to apply the non-statutory labor exemption was "very much a
matter of accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to
the policy of the labor laws."81
In reaching that conclusion, the Court fashioned the "in-
timately related" test, which provided that an agreement be-
tween parties to a collective bargaining relationship is ex-
empt from the application of antitrust law if the agreement:
1) concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining;82 2)
putes." See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151.
76. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-37. Among the statutes generally relied on as
supporting the non-statutory labor exemption are the Clayton Act and the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17; 29 U.S.C. § 52; Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113.
77. See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that
Wood's antitrust claims must fail because "no one seriously contends that the
antitrust laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our federal
labor policy as set out in the National Labor Relations Act"). Id.
78. See Marks, supra note 16, at 730-31; see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
79. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
80. Id. at 680.
81. Id. at 689 (citing United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965)).
82. Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining generally include wages,
hours, working conditions, and other terms of employment. See 29 U.S.C. §
158(d) (2000).
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is intimately related to that subject; and, 3) is the product of
bona-fide, arms-length negotiating 3 between the parties.'
Thus, the Jewel Tea test encourages collective bargaining by
generally exempting those efforts from a court's antitrust
scrutiny, but nonetheless provides that the exemption does
not shield all collective bargaining efforts.8 5
2. The Follow Naturally/Connell Construction Approach
Without explicitly overruling Jewel Tea, the Court in
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local
100 ("Connell Construction") adopted a distinct approach to
the application of the non-statutory labor exemption." In
Connell Construction, a Dallas-area union, Local 100, re-
quested that Connell Construction sign an agreement that
would require it to subcontract its work only to those outfits
that were members of Local 100.87 When Connell Construc-
tion refused, Local 100 staged a picketing campaign.88 Al-
though it ultimately signed the agreement under protest,
Connell Construction filed suit alleging antitrust law viola-
tions.89 Although the Court found the reduction of nonunion
members' competition was a legal end to pursue, it noted that
the non-statutory exemption from antitrust scrutiny was not
warranted simply because Local 100's goal was legal. °
Instead, Justice Powell concluded that the agreement
was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny because it failed a
three-part inquiry: it was negotiated outside the collective
bargaining context; it amounted to a direct restraint on trade
with substantial anticompetitive effects; and its effects did
not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
83. See supra note 74.
84. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90.
85. See generally Marks, supra note 16, at 737-38 (explaining the restric-
tions that different Justices proposed before they would apply the nonstatutory
labor exemption in Jewel Tea, as well as those created by lower courts inter-
preting Jewel Tea).
86. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
87. Id. at 619-20.
88. Id. at 620.
89. Id at 620-21.
90. Federal labor policy requires tolerance for a degree of reduced competi-
tion and, therefore, a degree of protection from antitrust laws. Connell Constr.,
421 U.S. at 622. The nonstatutory labor exemption fills this dual role. Id.
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wages and working conditions.9 The Court's approach, as ar-
ticulated by Justice Powell's opinion, is now commonly re-
92ferred to as the "follow naturally" test. . More succinctly
stated, the follow naturally test attempts to accommodate
federal labor policy's need for a degree of reduced competition
by prohibiting only those provisions whose anticompetitive
effects would not follow naturally from allowing for that de-
gree of reduced competition in negotiating wages, hours, and
working conditions.93
Whether applying Connell Construction's "follow natu-
rally" test or Jewel Teds "intimately related" approach, the
clear requirement for a challenged provision to gain exemp-
tion from antitrust scrutiny is that the labor law policy favor-
ing collective bargaining must first be respected.'
D. The Case ofMaurice Clarett
1. Background and "The Rule"
Maurice Clarett was a student-athlete at The Ohio State
University ("OSU") who, because of certain NCAA violations
not relevant to this comment, was suspended from the OSU
football team.9 In anticipation of not being able to return to
OSU, Clarett sought early eligibility for the NFL draft in
April of 2004.96 However, NFL officials, including NFL Com-
missioner Paul Tagliabue, publicly announced that Clarett
would not be admitted to the NFL's draft prior to his senior
year at OSU.97 The league's decision is based upon a state-
ment contained within the 2003 amended version of Article
XII of the NFL's Bylaws ("the Rule"), which limits eligibility
for the draft to players who have been graduates of high
91. Id. at 625 (articulating the "follow naturally" test).
92. See Marks, supra note 16, at 740-42.
93. Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 625.
94. See Marks, supra note 16, at 743. "From a practical standpoint, the
tests should reach the same result." Id.
95. Damon Hack, Lawyer Says Clarett Prefers Return to Buckeyes Over
Draft, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at D-6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/17/sports/ncaafootball/17CLAR.html?8br (last
visited Oct. 2, 2004). Clarrett was suspended for the entire season when he
allegedly accepted improper benefits and lied to NCAA and school investigators.
Id.
96. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126.
97. Complaint of Clarett, supra note 70, at T 25.
2004
SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW
school for a predetermined length of time.9
Historically, the league required that its entering players
wait until at least four years after high school graduation to
become draft eligible. 99 However, in 1990, the requirement
was relaxed to allow early entry by players for whom only
three years had elapsed since high school graduation."' The
only additional requirement for early entry was to file an ap-
plication with the NFL's commissioner, and there is every in-
dication that those petitions were regularly granted.'
In 1993, the NFLPA and the NFLMC entered into a new
collective bargaining agreement that, despite its comprehen-
siveness on issues such as rookie drafting and rookie compen-
sation,0 2 did not itself contain any version of the Rule.0 3
Instead, the Rule is contained within Article XII of the
NFL Bylaws."0 However, the NFLMC provided the NFLPA
with a copy of its most recent Bylaws as amended in 1992,
along with a letter ("the Letter") confirming that the Bylaw
provisions were "presently existing" as "referenced in Article
IV, Section 2, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement."'0 0
In 2003, the NFL amended Article XII of the Bylaws,
which still contained the Rule, to include a generic statement
that a player for whom four seasons had not elapsed could
apply for special eligibility.' The NFL Bylaws, as amended
in 2003, also refer to a 1990 memorandum from the league's
commissioner issued "pursuant to his authority under the By-
98. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127.
99. Id. at 126.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 127.
102. Id. Rookie drafting and rookie compensation, or the methods by which
young players are granted admission to professional sports leagues, have been
held to be mandatory subjects of collective bargaining and, therefore, have regu-
larly been included directly in the collective bargaining agreements of those
leagues. See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. 231; NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995).
103. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128. Instead, the Rule was incorporated by refer-
ence into the Collective Bargaining Agreement via the reference to the NFL's
Bylaws.
104. Id. at 127. Article XII of the NFL Bylaws, titled "Eligibility of Players,"
provides in relevant part that upon exception, players who had received "Spe-
cial Eligibility" from the NFL Commissioner could enter the NFL's draft so long
as at least three NFL seasons had passed since the player graduated from high
school. Id.
105. Id. at 128 (internal citations omitted).
106. Id.
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laws to establish necessary policies and procedures." °7 The
1990 memorandum provides that a player may also apply for
special eligibility so long as "three full college seasons have
elapsed since high school graduation.' '"0
2. Clarett's Position
Clarett argues that the Rule amounts to a group boycott,
or refusal to deal, that is "an unreasonable restraint on trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act," and, further,
that the non-statutory labor exemption does not shield the
Rule from antitrust scrutiny.0 9 Clarett contends that, al-
though the Rule was a part of the 1992 NFL Bylaws,"0 it is
not included in the current version of the NFL Bylaws as ef-
fective in 2003. Instead, Clarett asserts that the only part of
the 2003 Bylaws that has any bearing on his NFL draft eligi-
bility is contained in the NFL commissioner's memorandum
allowing players to petition for special draft eligibility."'
Clarett's position is that the incorporation of the Rule either
solely via the commissioner's 1990 memorandum, or by the
notice to the players in the Letter, is insufficient to meet the
"good-faith collective bargaining" requirement that would
merit the protection of the non-statutory labor exemption.1
2
Clarett further argues that application of the non-
statutory labor exemption is inappropriate in his case be-
cause the Rule affects parties outside the collective bargain-
ing relationship in question and does not concern a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining."' As such, Clarett main-
tains that the Rule is subject to the close antitrust scrutiny
generally applicable to group boycotts"4 and should fail that
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal citations omitted).
109. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
110. Reply Memorandum of Clarett at 6, Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2004) (No. 04-0943-cv) (citing NFL Bylaw 12.1(E)),
http://www.sskrplaw.com/nfl/clarettreply.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review). The rule states that "three NFL seasons
must have elapsed since the player was graduated from high school" before a
player may become eligible for the NFL draft. Id.
111. Id.
112. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141-42.
113. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 391. This oft-cited test was fashioned by
the Eighth Circuit in its decision in Mackey, 543 F.2d 606. See also discussion
supra Part II.E.2.b.
114. See Kior's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207.
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scrutiny. 115
3. The NFL'S Position
The NFL argues that the Rule is shielded from antitrust
scrutiny by application of the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion." 6 The NFL asserts that the eligibility rule itself was the
subject of collective bargaining,"' that the players discussed
the Rule with the NFLPA and agreed not to challenge it," 8
and that the Rule also concerns a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining."9
Even if the Rule does not merit protection from antitrust
scrutiny by the non-statutory labor exemption, the NFL con-
tends that the Rule can still pass antitrust muster. 12 0  The
parties agree that a per se rule of illegality.2 is no longer vi-
able in the sports context and that the "rule of reason" analy-
sis is appropriate."2 To this end, the league offers three justi-
fications in support of its draft eligibility policy: 1) to protect
younger and/or less experienced players from injury;"' 2) to
protect the NFL clubs from the costs and potential liability
associated with those injuries;"4 and 3) to prevent younger
players from utilizing unhealthy methods to achieve NFL-
level physiques.
12
115. Clarett, 306 F.Supp.2d at 408. The district court declined to apply a per
se approach and, instead, relied on the Supreme Court's recent application of a
"quick look" approach. Id. This approach, which falls under the broader head-
ing of "rule of reason" approaches, will invalidate a rule or regulation where its
anticompetitive effect is quickly apparent. Id. (citing Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999)).
116. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130.
117. Reply of Clarett, supra note 110 at 9. On this point, the NFL relied on
the Declaration of Peter Ruocco, the NFL's Vice President of Labor Relations,
who stated that the NFLMC forced the NFLPA to the table to discuss amend-
ment to the Rule. Id. See also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142.
118. Reply of Clarett, supra note 110, at 10.
119. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139. The Second Circuit accepted this argu-
ment, relying on its opinion in Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n that a
condition upon which the league could base its decision to refuse to hire particu-
lar players was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Id. (citing Cald-
well v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cir. 1995)).
120. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 397-411.
121. See discussion supra pp. 160-61.
122. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405; accord NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984); see also discussion on "rule of reason" supra pp. 159-63.
123. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
124. Reply of Clarett, supra note 110, at 3 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
125. Id.; see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
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Clarett has placed at issue whether or not the non-
statutory labor exemption applies to shield the Rule from an-
titrust scrutiny.'26 If it does, Clarett's claim must fail. If it
does not, the Rule is subject to antitrust scrutiny, and the
NFL's justifications for it become relevant. 17 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has recently resolved these issues in the
NFL's favor.' 8  However, in light of Supreme Court and
Eighth Circuit case law, there is substantial reason to be con-
cerned about the potential impact of the court's ruling.
E. Prior Treatment of the Issues in Clarett's Case
1. The Sherman Act and Professional Sports
Athletes have often cited the Sherman Act as a basis for
claiming that the actions of a particular professional sports
league restrain their capacity to pursue athletic careers. 28 In
particular, athletes have often challenged restraints on entry
into a particular league as group boycotts or refusals to
132deal.' The cases of Spencer Haywood,"' Herbert Deesen,
and Kenneth Linseman 33 are perhaps the most factually
similar to that of Maurice Clarett and provide apt illustra-
tions of judicial approaches to the application of the Sherman
Act in the context of entry to professional sports leagues.
a. Spencer Haywood and the National Basketball
Association
In 1969, Spencer Haywood signed a contract to play for
the Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association.
34
126. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
127. Id. at 397.
128. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143.
129. See Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Radovich, 352 U.S. 445; Powell v. NFL, 930
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
130. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (striking restriction on entry to
National Basketball Association); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F.
Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (striking similar restriction on entry to National
Hockey League); Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Pro-
Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bowman v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975).
131. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
132. Deesen, 358 F.2d at 165.
133. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1315.
134. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060. At the time, there were two pro-
fessional basketball leagues of approximately equal caliber in the United
States, the American Basketball Association and the National Basketball Asso-
2004
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Following a contract dispute with the Rockets, Haywood
signed a contract with the Seattle Supersonics of the National
Basketball Association ("NBA") and attempted to play for the
Supersonics during the 1970-1971 season.'35 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the NBA's commissioner declared Haywood ineligible
pursuant to the league's "Four-Year Rule," which stated that
a player was not eligible to compete in the league until four
years had elapsed from the time of that player's high school
graduation. 3 ' Haywood challenged the rule as constituting a
group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act.'
37
Absent a collective bargaining relationship between the
NBA players and owners, the case was decided entirely under
an antitrust analysis, where the court determined that the
Four-Year Rule merited a "rule of reason" exception similar
to that in Silver.3 ' After first deciding that section 1 of the
Sherman Act was applicable because of the rule's significant
effect on trade and because the rule constituted a "contract,
combination ... or conspiracy,"' 9 the district court relied on
the test articulated in Standard Oi 40 and the exception cre-
ciation.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1059. The Four-Year Rule as stated in the NBA bylaws reads:
High School Graduate, etc. A person who has not com-
pleted high school or who has completed high school
but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be
drafted or to be a Player until four years after he has
been graduated or four years after his original high
school class has been graduated, as the case may be,
nor may the future services of any such person be ne-
gotiated or contracted for, or otherwise reserved. Simi-
larly, a person who has entered college but is no
longer enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to
be a Player until the time when he would have first
become eligible had he remained enrolled in college.
Any negotiations or agreements with any such person
during such period shall be null and void and shall
confer no rights whatsoever; nor shall a Member vio-
lating the provisions of this paragraph be permitted to
acquire the rights to the services of such person at any
time thereafter.
Id. at 1059 (internal citation omitted).
137. Id. at 1060.
138. See id. at 1064-66 (detailing the Court's analysis and the rationale un-
derlying its adoption of the "rule of reason" exception to the per se rule of ille-
gality generally applicable to group boycotts).
139. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
140. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1. The Standard Oil approach balances the
justifications for a challenged provision against its anticompetitive effect, strik-
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ated by Silver.' Although the court's decision did not ulti-
mately rest on applying either Silves exception or Standard
Oils test, its analysis of the NBA's group boycott or refusal to
deal did nonetheless rely on some of the elements contained
therein. For that reason, the district court's analysis provides
insight into, and is helpful in evaluating, the Second Circuit's
decision in Clarett.
In applying the policy-driven analysis of Silver to the
challenged NBA bylaw, the court reviewed and rejected the
NBA's three justifications for maintaining the bylaw.' The
court rejected the league's argument of financial necessity for
the rule based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Kior's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. ("Klor'')." The court then dis-
carded the assertion that the league's stated desire to ensure
education for all NBA players on the grounds that such poli-
cies should be decided by Congress." Finally, the court re-
jected the league's implicit argument that it was entitled to a
free system for player development.4 '
Although the court explicitly recognized that the subjec-
tive balancing approach in Standard Oil was unworkable,'46
its analysis (purportedly under the narrow "rule of reason"
exception of Silver) nonetheless included a discussion of un-
due and unreasonable burdens typical of Standard Oil bal-
ancing.47 The court managed to avoid a "difficult and
lengthy" and "very subjective ' inquiry into the actual neces-
ing those provisions whose anticompetitive effects are thus "unreasonable" in
light of its potential benefit. See id.
141. Silver, 373 U.S. 341. The Silver exception to the per se rule of illegality
generally applied to refusals to deal, or group boycotts, and uphold such provi-
sions provided compliance with four criteria: 1) there is a statute or other legis-
lative mandate concerning the subject matter of the challenged act/provision; 2)
the act/provision is in conformance with the policy underlying that mandate; 3)
the act/provision is no more extensive than necessary; and, 4) there are ade-
quate safeguards to prevent the arbitrary enforcement of the provision. See id.
at 363-64.
142. DenverRockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
143. Id. (relying on Kor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207); see also discussion infra Part
II.E.l.b.
144. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
145. Id. Haywood argued, and the court seemed to implicitly accept, that the
NBA used high school and collegiate basketball leagues as a free means to de-
velop and scout its potential players prior to their eligibility for the NBA draft.
Id.
146. Id. at 1063; see also supra note 140.
147. See discussion supra p. 159.
148. Id.
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sity of the NBA's justifications for the rule, which, as a re-
fusal to deal/group boycott, was found to be a per se violation
of the Sherman Act as in !lor. 1 49 In basing its decision on
the Four-Year Rule's blanket application to all potential play-
ers without a mechanism allowing players to petition for spe-
cial consideration, 5 ° the court also implicitly revived the
fourth prong of the Silver approach.' In effect, the court in-
corporated aspects of both the Silver and the Standard Oil
approaches into its decision, and also recognized the general
rule that refusals to deal violate the Sherman Act.
b. Kenneth Linseman and the National Hockey
League
Kenneth Linseman was a nineteen-year-old hockey
player who, while competing for the Kingston Canadians in a
junior Canadian hockey league, was drafted by the Birming-
ham Bulls of the professional World Hockey Association
("WHA"). 152 Subsequently, the president of the WHA in-
formed him that he was ineligible to play in the league pur-
suant to WHA Operating Regulation section 17.2(a) (the
"twenty-year-old rule"), limiting players eligible for the
league's draft to those over the age of twenty.
1 53
In granting an injunction preventing the twenty-year-old
rule's enforcement, the district court noted the history of such
group boycotts as being found per se illegal." The court high-
lighted the difficulties of applying the Standard Oil "rule of
reason" to group boycotts, which had led to the adoption of
that per se approach in the first place. 55 After weighing its
149. lIor's, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (stating general rule that refusals to
deal/group boycotts amount to per se violations of the Sherman Act).
150. Id. at 1066.
151. Silver, 373 U.S. at 348-49. The fourth prong of the Silver exception
looks for adequate safeguards against the arbitrary enforcement of the chal-
lenged provision.
152. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317-18.
153. Id. at 1318 n.3. The "twenty-year-old rule" provided that "[e]ach Mem-
ber Club shall make its selections from among the players who attain their
twentieth (20th) birthdays between January 1st, next preceding the conduct of
the draft, and December 31st, next following the conduct of the draft both dates
included." Id. (internal citation omitted).
154. Id. at 1320 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957)).
See also Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Kor', Inc.,
359 U.S. 207.
155. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1320. The court noted that applying the
Standard Oil "rule of reason" approach led the courts to undertake subjective
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options, the court found the league's twenty-year-old rule to
be per se illegal and not deserving of the Silver exception to
the per se treatment.
15 6
The distinguishing feature of the Linseman court's Silver
analysis is its focus on the WHA's justifications for the chal-
lenged rule under Silvei's second prong."' The WHA argued
that if the rule was struck down, a flood of young players
would leave the junior leagues for the bigger money in the
WHA, and that, as a result, the junior hockey leagues would
not survive for lack of sufficiently talented young players.5
However, the court responded by stating, "the Sherman Act
does not permit a failing enterprise to be buoyed up with an
illegal agreement to restrain trade.""9  Furthermore, the
WHA argued that if younger players did not spend time play-
ing in the junior leagues, the WHA would consequently lose
its free "training ground" for prospective players.'" As to the
league's second justification, the court noted that even if a
free "training ground" were necessary to the league's sur-
vival, it did not create a "need for concerted action as to which
specific players will be employed."''
Linseman argued that his current salary with the King-
ston team was only $75 per week, or $21,600 over six years,
and that his contract with Birmingham guaranteed him at
minimum a total of $500,000 over six seasons.'62 Further, the
$500,000 amount excluded additional compensation, the
amount of which "would be impossible to determine if he were
presently denied the opportunity to test his skills against
those of other professionals." '63 The district court accepted
Linseman's arguments, noting the career span of a profes-
sional athlete is relatively short in duration, and found the
WHA's justifications for its rule did not support depriving
factual inquiries and reach policy-driven decisions that often encroached on the
legislative function. Id.
156. Id. at 1321-23.
157. See discussion supra Part II.A. The second prong of the Silver analysis
generally looks at the underlying policy reasons justifying an entity's refusal to
deal. Id.
158. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1321.
162. Id. at 1318.
163. Id. at 1319.
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Linseman of even one year of his career."
In reaching a conclusion similar to that in the case of
Spencer Haywood, 6' the court held that the determination of
which players should be eligible for the WHA, under a free
market system, "ought to be left up to each individual
team."'66
c. Herbert Deesen and the Professional Golfer's
Association
Herbert Deesen was declared ineligible to play in the
Professional Golfers' Association ("PGA") tournaments after
several subpar performances in 1958.16 Although the PGA
maintained a virtual monopoly over professional golf tourna-
ments in the United States, 6 ' the district court relied on Su-
preme Court precedent 6 9 to find that the league's actions with
respect to Deesen amounted to a reasonable restraint of
trade. 70 The PGA excluded Deesen as a means of increasing
competition within the league and only did so after he had
been given an opportunity to petition for reinstatement by
playing a number of "test" rounds. 7' Because the PGA's ac-
tions were driven by the league's need to limit the number of
tournament-eligible players to those who could compete in a
single day, subject to review by a PGA player board, they
tended to promote competition and therefore did not contra-
vene the policies of the Sherman Act.'7 2
Linseman subsequently affirmed Deesens holding in
finding the WHA's actions distinguishable from the PGA's.'7 '
164. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1319 (noting that the loss of even one
year of the career of a professional athlete amounted to an irreparable injury).
165. DenverRockets, 325 F. Supp. 1049.
166. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321.
167. Deesen, 358 F.2d at 168.
168. Id. at 171 n.7. The court recognized this, although noted at the time
that the PGA did not sponsor five or six of the major professional golf tourna-
ments in the United States in a given year. Id.
169. Id. at 170 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918)).
170. Id. at 170-71. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States, the district court noted, "[t]he true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and thereby perhaps
[sic] promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even de-
stroy competition." Id. at 170 (citing Bd of Trade of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238).
171. Id. at 168.
172. Id. at 171-72.
173. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1323.
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The Linseman court noted the WHA's rule was clearly infe-
rior to the PGA's on the basis that the WHA's rule was com-
pletely arbitrary, that it suppressed competition, and that it
was governed by a blanket application rather than by any
sort of skill assessment.1 4 The Deesen decision is also signifi-
cant because it recognizes that a skill-based, as opposed to a
blanket age-based, restraint is both a viable and workable
means for limiting a player's eligibility to participate in pro-
fessional sports75 and does not contravene the provisions of
the Sherman Act.'76
Although the cases of Denver Rockets, Linseman, and
Deesen do not address restraints on trade in an industry
where a collective bargaining relationship exists, they do pro-
vide a clear indication that the Sherman Act mandates that a
restraint on entry into a professional sports league should
promote competition in that league or else it will risk per se
illegality as a group boycott or refusal to deal. The next sec-
tion will discuss the impact the collective bargaining relation-
ship has on similar restraints on trade, and how the Second
Circuit's strong adherence to federal labor laws has guided it
to conclude that the mandates of the Sherman Act are secon-
dary to those of federal labor laws.
2. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption and Professional
Sports
Over the past thirty years, there have been a number of
disputes between professional sports players and owners that
arise at the intersection between federal labor and antitrust
laws."'7 Although many of these cases involved antitrust is-
sues similar to those discussed above in Section A, they were
instead decided by applying federal labor laws.'78
In an industry where a collective bargaining relationship
174. Id.
175. See Deesen, 358 F.2d at 168-69.
176. Id. at 171-72. Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's test articulated
in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, the district court found that the
PGA had adopted reasonable measures to promote competition that did not
amount to either a violation of Sherman Act section 1 or 2. Id. at 170-72 (citing
Bd. of Trade of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238).
177. See Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Powell v. NFL, 930
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Caldwel, 66 F.3d 523; Williams, 45 F.3d 684; Wood,
809 F.2d 954.
178. See Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Powell, 930 F.2d 1293;
Caldwell, 66 F.3d 523; Williams, 45 F.3d 684; Wood, 809 F.2d 954.
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is established, federal labor laws generally govern that rela-
tionship, and the Sherman Act applies only in limited cir-
cumstances.'79 Effectively, only if a questioned practice or
rule fails to qualify for the protection of the non-statutory la-
bor exemption, is it then subject to antitrust scrutiny.80 As
the Supreme Court most recently stated in deciding Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc. ("Brown"),8 the application of implicit
(non-statutory) antitrust exemptions is "not intended to insu-
late from antitrust review everyjoint imposition of terms by
employers."'82 This section will discuss the application of the
non-statutory labor exemption in the context of professional
sports and, more specifically, the distinct approaches of the
Second and Eighth Circuits and how those unique approaches
impacted the Court's later application of the exemption in
Brown.
a. The Second Circuit's Approach: Leon Wood, Joe
Caldwell, and Charles Williams Take the
Court Against the NBA and ABA
The Second Circuit's decisions in Wood v. NBA, 83 Cald-
well v. American Basketball Ass'n,' and NBA v. Williams8'
demonstrate its application of the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion in cases alleging improper restraints on trade within a
labor market characterized by a collective bargaining rela-
tionship and a multi-employer collective bargaining unit.
8 6
These decisions are marked by a strong adherence to federal
labor laws and policy87 and are predictive of the likelihood
179. Brown, 518 U.S. at 237.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). The Court noted that "an agreement
among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances
from the collective-bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust interven-
tion would not significantly interfere with that process." Id.
183. Wood, 809 F.2d 954.
184. Caldwell, 66 F.3d 523.
185. Williams, 45 F.3d 684.
186. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134. The court declined to follow the approach of
the Eighth Circuit partly because it found the Eighth's Circuit's approach to be
inconsistent with its own decisions. Id. at 133-34. The Second Circuit followed
its own prior decisions as precedent because it found that they comported with
the Supreme Court's approach and result. Id. at 138.
187. Wood, 809 F.2d at 963 ("Wood's claim is beyond peradventure one that
implicates the labor market and subverts federal labor policy."); Caldwell, 66
F.3d at 530 ("Unlike the claim in Wood, Caldwell's claim regarding his dis-
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that the Second Circuit will apply the non-statutory labor ex-
emption to claims relating to a labor market characterized by
collective bargaining in order to protect the labor policy of fa-
voring such efforts.
1. Leon Wood v. NBA
After being drafted into the NBA by the Philadelphia
76ers, Leon Wood filed suit contesting a number of provisions
contained in the league's collective bargaining agreement.
18
Citing Sherman Act section I violations,'89 Wood alleged that
several provisions were tantamount to a NBA conspiracy to
curb his pursuit of a NBA career. 9 ° Specifically, the con-
tested provisions granted the 76ers exclusive rights to
Wood,' required the 76ers to limit his salary,92 and further
granted the 76ers a right of first refusal upon expiration of its
exclusive rights to Wood.
93
The district court upheld the challenged rules as exempt
from antitrust scrutiny via application of the Mackey v.
NFL9 4 approach.' 95 The Second Circuit, fearful of reaching a
charge is not directly inconsistent with substantive federal labor law. Never-
theless, allowing Caldwell to proceed with his action would subvert fundamen-
tal principles of our federal labor policy as set out in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.") (internal citations omitted); see Wiliams, 45 F.3d at 694.
188. Wood, 809 F.2d at 956.
189. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
vides in relevant part that, "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id.
190. Wood, 809 F.2d at 958.
191. Id. at 957. The operation of the NBA's draft system, or the system by
which young players entering the league are generally selected, included a pro-
vision that upon drafting a player, a team would have exclusive rights within
the league to sign him to a contract for up to one year. Id.
192. Id. The NBA also adopted a salary cap, or a maximum amount of
money that any given team could spend (total) in a given year to pay all of its
players. Id. Because the 76ers had reached its salary cap level at the time
Wood was drafted, they were only able to offer him a nominal contract for his
first year of play. Id. at 958.
193. Id. Once the one-year period of exclusive rights to a player's contract
had expired, the drafting team was given an opportunity to match any offer
made to the drafted player by another team at that time. Id. at 957.
194. Mackey, 543 F.2d 606. The Mackey approach, discussed infra Part
II.E.2.b, looks at three factors to decide if the non-statutory labor exemption
applies: which parties are primarily impacted by the challenged provision;
whether the provision concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining;
and whether there is evidence that good faith collective bargaining occurred on
the subject/provision. Id. at 614.
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decision that would allow Wood to subvert federal labor pol-
icy,"' reached the same conclusion based on the ongoing col-
lective bargaining relationship between the owners and the
NBA players.'97
2. Joe Caldwell v. American Basketball
Association
Joe Caldwell signed a five-year contract to play for the
Carolina Cougars of the American Basketball Association in
1970.198 However, as a result of allegations that Caldwell had
violated league rules, he was terminated by the Cougars and
never played professional basketball again.'99 Caldwell filed
suit, asserting that the National Basketball Association
20 0
blacklisted him in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,20'
and, also, that the league improperly monopolized the market
for professional basketball in the United States in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.20 2
The district court found that Caldwell's physical limita-
tions as a thirty-three-year-old with multiple injuries were
the actual cause of the end of his basketball career, and that
as a result he had failed to state a claim under the Sherman
195. Wood, 809 F.2d at 958 (citing Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)). Although there is no explicit reference to the Mackey approach, the dis-
trict court's ruling clearly encompasses each of the Mackey factors. See discus-
sion infra Part II.E.2.b.
196. Wood, 809 F.2d at 963. The court did not even reach an antitrust analy-
sis because of its fear of contradicting federal labor policy (to promote collective
bargaining efforts) as set out in the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 959.
The court stated "[t]his is not collective bargaining as intended by Congress.
Indeed, it is not bargaining at all." Id. at 963.
197. Id. at 961-62.
198. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 525.
199. Id. at 525-26. Allegedly, as a member of the Cougars, Caldwell aided a
teammate in planning an incident whereby the teammate "jumped the team" -
a negotiation tactic forbidden by the league. Id. Although the teammate re-
turned to the team soon thereafter, the team suspended Caldwell pursuant to
certain terms in his individual contract, because they believed that he had been
involved in planning the incident. Id. (internal citations omitted).
200. Id. at 526. The American Basketball Association merged into, and be-
came a part of, the National Basketball Association after the 1975-1976 season.
Id. Further, although Caldwell's case was filed in early 1975, due to his bank-
ruptcy proceedings, his case was not heard by the district court until 1993. Id.
201. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts which amount to re-
straints of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
202. Caidwell, 66 F.3d at 526. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits mo-
nopolization efforts. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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Act . In upholding the district court's decision, the Second
Circuit relied again on the federal labor policy to promote col-
lective bargaining, and found the NBA's refusal to hire Cald-
well to be in good faith and immune from antitrust scrutiny
based on the collective bargaining relationship between NBA
players and owners."
3. NBA v. Charles Williams
At the end of the 1994 NBA season, the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the players and owners expired."5
Charles Williams and other NBA players contested the same
three provisions of the NBA's collective bargaining agreement
as Leon Wood. The difference in Williams's case is that the
players waited until the expiration of the effective bargaining
agreement.0 6 Therefore, while there was still an ongoing col-
lective bargaining relationship, there was no collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect." '
The NBA owners refused to take out the challenged pro-
visions. They claimed that the 1994 collective bargaining
agreement simply maintained the status quo, the players' re-
fusal to agree to the questioned terms was not in good faith,
and the provisions were necessary for them to maintain a
strong bargaining position relative to the players associa-
tion.
208
The district court upheld the owners' unilateral imple-
mentation of the terms into the 1994 collective bargaining
agreement.2 9 Purporting to apply the Eighth Circuit's ap-
proach from Powell v. NFL,21 the district court found the
owners' acts immune from antitrust scrutiny based on the
203. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 526.
204. Id. at 530. The court reached its decision based on its reading of the
NLRA to provide that actions taken by the league in the context of collective
bargaining relationship, with the collective bargaining representative of the
league's players, were to be insulated from antitrust review. Id.
205. Williams, 45 F.3d at 686.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id, at 687-89.
209. Id. at 686.
210. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989). The "Powell ap-
proach" dictates that so long as a collective bargaining relationship exists, anti-
trust immunity protects actions of either party to that relationship even if the
bargaining over a particular term goes to impasse and no actual agreement is
reached. Id.
2004
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collective bargaining relationship existing with the players. 1'
The Second Circuit, relying instead on the Supreme Court
decisions in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 44.4"
and Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB,2"' reached essen-
tially the same conclusion. 14 The court ultimately found that
the actions of the NBA owners, likely otherwise per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act,"5 deserved immunity from anti-
trust scrutiny because of a "longstanding if unspoken as-
sumption that multiemployer collective bargaining was not
subject to the antitrust laws ....""'
Together, Wood, Caidwell, and Williams demonstrate the
Second Circuit's reluctance, based on its adherence to federal
labor policy to promote collective bargaining, to consider a
plaintiffs antitrust claims so long as those claims arise in a
labor market characterized by collective bargaining.
b. The Eighth Circuit's Approach: Mackey v. NFL
In 1963, in the interest of promoting competition within
the league, the NFL unilaterally implemented the Rozelle
Rule. 17 The Rozelle Rule provided that upon the termination
of a player's contract, he would become a free agent capable of
contracting with any league team.21 However, the Rozelle
Rule further provided that the NFL commissioner had discre-
tion to grant the player's former club the right to one or more
players from his new team.1 9
On behalf of himself and other NFL players, John
Mackey filed suit claiming that the NFL's actions amounted
to an illegal restraint that denied him the right to freely con-
tract for his services.22 ° Although the Rozelle Rule was ulti-
mately struck down as a violation of the Sherman Act,2 the
court first considered the potential application of the non-
211. Williams, 45 F.3d at 686.
212. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
213. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
214. Williams, 45 F.3d at 692-93.
215. Id. at 692.
216. Id. at 693.
217. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610-11.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 611. The league's commissioner was given this discretion based
on the league's concern that the Rozelle Rule could otherwise lead to drastic
alterations in the competitive balance between league teams. Id.
220. Id. at 609.
221. Id. at 623.
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statutory labor exemption.222
In 1963, the NFL first included the Rozelle Rule as an
amendment to the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.2 3 In 1968,
at the first meeting of the newly formed NFLPA and NFLMC,
the two groups argued from the outset as to the terms of the
Rozelle Rule. 24 However, at the termination of the parties'
1968 discussions, the Rozelle Rule was incorporated by refer-
ence into the 1968 Collective Bargaining Agreement along
with the remainder of the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws.225
At the 1970 collective bargaining negotiations between
the parties, the NFLPA again expressed the players' discon-
tent with the Rozelle Rule.26 The NFLPA complained that
the Rozelle Rule prevented certain players from signing con-
tracts, but due to more pressing issues, the NFLPA could not
afford the time to sufficiently fight to exclude the Rozelle
Rule.22 ' However, the 1970 CBA did not incorporate the NFL
Constitution or Bylaws by reference.2 8 Instead, as the NFL
later claimed, "it was their understanding" that the Rozelle
Rule remained in effect.22 9 The only manner in which the Ro-
zelle Rule remained in effect (in writing) was via the Stan-
dard Player Contract230 signed by all players, which incorpo-
rated the terms of NFL's Constitution and Bylaws by refer-
231
ence.
In 1974, the NFLPA vehemently contested the Rule at
the parties' collective bargaining meetings, and bargaining
222. See id. at 613-18.
223. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
224. Id. at 612. At that time, the players sought to modify the Rozelle Rule
but, due to other pressing issues and lack of bargaining power at the negotia-
tions, were not able to modify or exclude it. Id.
225. Id. at 613.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 613. The court's opinion does not indicate why the 1970 Collective
Bargaining Agreement did not incorporate the NFL's Constitution or Bylaws.
Id.
229. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613. At the trial court level, bargaining represen-
tatives for both sides indicated it was their understanding that the Rozelle Rule
remained in effect during the term of the 1970 collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
230. The terms of the 1970 Collective Bargaining Agreement included a pro-
vision that required each player to sign a "Standard Player Contract," which
governed player-owner relations and provided that the player agreed to be
bound by the NFL's Bylaws and Constitution. Id. at 613.
231. Id.
1832004
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reached an impasse23 2 over that exact subject.23" The Eighth
Circuit, in deciding whether to apply the non-statutory labor
exemption to protect the Rozelle Rule from antitrust scrutiny,
noted "the availability of the non-statutory exemption for a
particular agreement turns upon whether the relevant fed-
eral labor policy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal an-
titrust policy under the circumstances of the particular
case." '234 The court then proceeded to review a lengthy list of
cases facing similar questions and fashioned a three-part test
as a result. 235
In attempting to "strike a balance" between the compet-
ing purposes and interests of labor and antitrust principles,
the Eighth Circuit synthesized a test that would apply the
non-statutory labor exemption only if: 1) the challenged pro-
vision primarily affected parties to the collective bargaining
relationship; 2) the provision concerned a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining;236 and, 3) the provision was the prod-
uct of bona-fide arms-length collective bargaining.237 Relying
heavily on Supreme Court precedent, the Eighth Circuit rec-
ognized that the NLRA envisioned that labor law principles
should preempt the application of antitrust law and princi-
ples where collective bargaining is present.28  However, it
232. "Impasse" has been defined by the National Labor Relations Board as
being "only a temporary 'deadlock' or 'hiatus' in negotiations which in almost all
cases is eventually broken, either through a change of mind or the application of
economic force." Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1093-94 (1979).
233. Id.
234. Id (citing Connell Constr., 421 U.S. 616; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676;
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)). Although recogniz-
ing the case before it was clearly factually dissimilar, the Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's approach to resolving the question. Id. (citing Con-
nell Constr., 421 U.S. 616).
235. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
236. Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include wages, hours, and
working conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
237. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. "Bona-fide arms-length collective bargaining"
is not statutorily defined, but, as the Mackey court interpreted it, a court would
be required to examine several factors: whether there was relative bargaining
power of the parties; whether the terms at issue were unilaterally imposed;
whether the terms at issue benefit both sides; and, whether or not the terms at
issue were ever a "focal point" of the negotiations. Id. at 615.
238. Id. at 614 n.12 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)). The court noted the ability, in a collective bargaining re-
lationship, of the parties to restrain trade to a greater extent than would be
allowable in the absence of such a relationship. Id. See also Connell Constr.,
421 U.S. at 622 (stating that federal labor law's "goals" could "never" be
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also recognized that "benefits to organized labor cannot be
utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employer's chestnuts out of the
antitrust fires."239 In other words, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the protection afforded by the non-statutory labor
exemption in a collective bargaining relationship is not un-
qualified.
Applying its test, the Eighth Circuit decided the terms of
the Rozelle Rule primarily concerned only parties to the col-
lective bargaining relationship.24 ° The court also found that
the Rozelle Rule concerned a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining 24' because it had the practical effect of reducing
player mobility and depressing player salaries.242 Nonethe-
less, the court held the Rozelle Rule did not merit the protec-
tion of the non-statutory labor exemption because it did not
represent the product of bona-fide arms-length negotiating.
243
The court focused on the facts that the Rule was unilaterally
promulgated by the league in 1963, that it continued to apply
after 1963 with only the NFLPA's passive acceptance, and
that it ultimately benefitted NFL owners to the detriment of
NFL players.24 The court also recognized the insufficiency of
the evidence offered by the NFL's owners as to the collective
bargaining that had occurred on the Rozelle Rule.
24
Having reached the conclusion that the Rozelle Rule did
not merit the protection of the non-statutory labor exemption,
the court then proceeded to evaluate the Rozelle Rule under a
"rule of reason" approach and ultimately invalidated the Ro-
achieved if ordinary anti-competitive effects of collective bargaining were held
to violate the antitrust laws); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 711 (finding that national
labor law scheme would be "virtually destroyed" by the routine imposition of
antitrust penalties upon parties engaged in collective bargaining).
239. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 n.12 (internal citations omitted).
240. Id. at 615.
241. Id. The court, relying on section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act, defined mandatory subjects of collective bargaining as anything affecting
"wages, hours and other terms or conditions of employment." Id. (citing 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000)).
242. Id. The court found that the determination of whether a particular sub-
ject was a mandatory one in a collective bargaining relationship was to be as-
sessed with respect to its practical effect and not simply its form. Id. (citing §
8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); Federation of Mu-
sicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968)).
243. Id. at 615-16.
244. Id.
245. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
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zelle Rule as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.4
Although factually similar and based on identical statu-
tory frameworks, the above cases before the Second and
Eighth Circuits were decided in conflicting manners. While
the Second Circuit applied the non-statutory labor exemption
nearly per se if a collective bargaining relationship was pre-
sent, the Eighth Circuit recognized that there are circum-
stances in which the presence of a collective bargaining rela-
tionship alone does not merit the protection of the non-
statutory labor exemption. Incorporating aspects of each ap-
proach, the Supreme Court recently decided the case of
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
2 47
c. The Supreme Court's Approach: Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.
When the collective bargaining agreement between the
NFL's players and owners expired in 1987, the two sides be-
gan to negotiate a new one.' s During the negotiations, the
NFL presented to the players "Resolution G-2" ("G-2"), a
proposition that would have allowed each NFL team a devel-
opmental squad for practice purposes.s Over the next three
months, the players and owners were not able to agree to the
terms of G-2, and negotiations reached impasse.250 Conse-
quently, the NFL owners unilaterally implemented G-2, and
Antony Brown and other developmental squad players filed
suit alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.25' In
upholding the NFL's decision, the Supreme Court held that
the non-statutory labor exemption protects what otherwise
would have amounted to an illegal restraint of trade in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.252
In reaching its decision, the Court made a number of no-
table distinctions. First, the Court declined to accept the con-
246. Id. at 620-22.
247. Brown, 518 U.S. 231.
248. Id. at 234.
249. Id. Developmental squads were to be comprised of rookie, or first-year
players, and players assigned to those squads would primarily be used by the
team in practice situations.
250. Id. at 235. The league sought to cap developmental squad player sala-
ries at $1,000 per week and to otherwise limit the benefits available to those
players. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 235.
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clusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
that federal labor laws were intended to waive any potential
antitrust liability related to the imposition of restraints on
trade where the challenged restraints were imposed in a la-
bor market characterized by collective bargaining.253 Thereby
declining to apply the non-statutory labor exemption simply
because a collective bargaining relationship existed,"M the
Court instead indicated that the exemption should be prop-
erly applied only where certain additional conditions had
been met.255
In fact, the test applied by the Court in Brown closely
paralleled the test described in Mackey, and it relied on simi-
lar Supreme Court precedent in doing so.56 Within the realm
of industrial conflict, the Court stated that the non-statutory
labor exemption should prevent a court from replacing the
considered will of the parties with its own decision as to what
constitutes a "reasonable" practice.257 Applying Mackey, the
Court upheld G-2 in finding that it affected only parties to the
collective bargaining relationship, that it concerned a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining,258 and that it was the re-
sult of bona-fide, arms-length, albeit unsuccessful, collective
bargaining. 5 '
Finally, after discussing why the NFL owners' unilateral
implementation of G-2 merited the protection afforded by the
non-statutory labor exemption, the Court cautioned that its
253. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235. Citing the 2-1 split below on this issue, the
Court explicitly stated that it did not accept that the non-statutory labor ex-
emption's protection swept as broadly as the lower court had concluded. Id.
254. The Supreme Court implicitly rejected an approach similar to the Sec-
ond Circuit's approach, as seen in Wood, Campbell, and Williams, of finding
that the presence of a collective bargaining relationship alone merits exempting
the actions of parties to that relationship from antitrust scrutiny. See discus-
sion supra Part II.E.2.a.
255. Also by implication, the Court stated its approval of an approach similar
to that applied by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey. See discussion supra Part
II.E.2.b. The Eighth Circuit's approach is that, in addition to a valid collective
bargaining relationship, exempting the efforts of the parties to that relationship
from antitrust scrutiny also requires the additional conditions that the chal-
lenged provision primarily affect only those parties, that it concern a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, and that the parties had bargained in good faith
over its terms. Id.
256. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236.
257. Id. at 237.
258. The mandatory subject of collective bargaining was wages. Id at 250.
259. Id.
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holding was "not intended to insulate from antitrust review
every joint imposition of terms by employers."26 ° In closing,
the Court reiterated the inappropriateness of a per se ap-
proach to the application of the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion in a labor market characterized by a collective bargain-
ing relationship.26'
F. Clarett's Day in Court: The Recent Opinions
1. The District Court: Another Touchdown for Clarett
Maurice Clarett filed suit against the NFL in September
2003, alleging that the league's decision to deny him early
access to its draft amounted to a group boycott or refusal to
deal in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.262
The district court's opinion relied heavily on the Eighth
Circuit's Mackey approach,263 and found that the Rule2" was
not exempted from antitrust scrutiny by the non-statutory
labor exemption because it did not concern a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining,2 5 it affected only complete
strangers to the collective bargaining relationship, and it was
not the product of arms-length negotiating between the
NFLPA and the NFLMC.266
The court then invalidated the Rule under a "quick look"
antitrust analysis, finding the Rule so "blatantly anticompeti-
tive" that nothing more was necessary to determine that the
Rule violated antitrust laws. 267  "Indeed, one can scarcely
260. Id. The Court further stated that "an agreement... could be suffi-
ciently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining
process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly
interfere with that process." Id.
261. See generally id. (stating that it is unnecessary to determine where a
rule permitting antitrust intervention needs to be drawn).
262. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129; see also Complaint of Clarett, supra note
70.
263. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.b.
264. The "Rule" prevents from competing in the NFL any player who has not
completed three college seasons or for whom three college seasons have not
elapsed since his high school graduation date. Complaint of Clarett, supra note
70 at T 14.
265. The district court found that the Rule did not concern a mandatory sub-
ject because it affected job eligibility and not the terms of actual employment
such as wages, hours, or employee benefits. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
266. Id. at 393-97.
267. Id. at 407-08. The "quick look" approach, as developed by the Supreme
Court, is appropriately applied where the anticompetitive effects of a challenged
provision can be easily ascertained even by the observation of a casual observer.
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think of a more blatantly anticompetitive policy than one that
excludes certain competitors from the market altogether."268
The court rejected the NFL's concern for potential injuries
caused by the presence in the league of younger, underdevel-
oped players, and noted that the league's concerns could be
better addressed with less restrictive and equally effective
269
means.
The district court then issued an order allowing Clarett
access to the 2004 NFL draft. 20 The NFL quickly moved for a
stay of that order and concurrently filed an appeal of the dis-
trict court's judgment.27'
2. The Second Circuit: Clarett's Touchdown is Reversed
No sooner had Clarett gained access to the NFL's 2004
draft than the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied that
access in May 2004.272 In doing so, the court held that the
non-statutory labor exemption shielded the Rule from anti-
trust scrutiny.273 After reaching this conclusion, the court
turned to its familiar approach: application of the non-
statutory labor exemption.274
Refusing to apply the Mackey test as the Supreme Court
had done in Brown,2 75 the court instead relied on its own
precedent in Caldwell, Wood, and Williams. 276 In doing so,
the court applied its virtual per se approach and used the
non-statutory labor exemption to trump the application of the
Sherman Act in a relationship characterized by collective
bargaining.
2 77
The court articulated that denying Clarett access to the
Id. at 408 (citing Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)).
268. Id.
269. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 143.
272. Id. at 129-30. The Second Circuit agreed to hear the NFL's appeal on
March 30, 2004. It heard oral argument on April 19, 2004, and vacated the dis-
trict court's order granting Clarett admission to the NFL's draft on May 24,
2004. Id.
273. Id. at 143.
274. Id. at 134-35.
275. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133-34 (stating "we... have never regarded the
Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the non-
statutory exemption," and rejecting the application of the frequently cited Su-
preme Court decisions in cases like Clarett's).
276. Id. at 134-38.
277. Id. at 143 (citing Wood, 809 F.2d at 961).
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draft was mandated by the policies underlying federal labor
laws."' The court indicated that upholding the Rule would
ensure meaningful collective bargaining,279 would safeguard
the compromises reached by the parties,28 ° and would give
sufficient effect to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown.281
The remainder of this comment will discuss the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Clarett as well as the potential implications
of adherence to that opinion in the future.
III. THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY CLARETT
v. NFL
The NFL has a recognized monopoly over professional
football in the United States.22 While antitrust law views
monopoly as a "necessary evil," federal labor law envisions
collective bargaining as an indispensable means of limiting
that evil.283 Striking the appropriate balance between labor
and antitrust is not a new task for the courts. s" In attempt-
ing to do so, courts are often forced to reach towards the outer
boundaries of the judicial role, accompanied by a correspond-
ing degree of apprehension to neither engage in legislative
nor labor board functions.2 5
But even greater harm may come in allowing a collective
bargaining entity to overstep its boundaries by taking advan-
tage of the protections afforded it when it acts within the con-
fines of a collective bargaining relationship.286 While federal
278. Id. at 143 ("Allowing Clarett to proceed with his antitrust suit would
subvert 'principles that have been familiar to, and accepted by, the nation's
workers for all of the NLRA's [sixty years] in every industry except professional
sports.'") (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 530). Id.
279. Id. at 131 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 237).
280. Id. at 143. In citing Wood, the court stated that labor law protection
extended as far as necessary "to safeguard the 'unique bundle of compromises'
reached by the NFL and the players union." Id. (quoting Wood, 809 F.2d at
961).
281. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 137-38.
282. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1983).
283. Marks, supra note 16, at 700.
284. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
285. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 700-09 (1965); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt.,
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see discussion supra Part II.E.2.
286. In order to promote collective bargaining, the non-statutory labor ex-
emption allows for parties to a collective bargaining relationship to engage in
behavior that would otherwise amount to violations of antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676. But applying the non-statutory labor exemption
Vol: 45
ANTITRUSTAND LABOR LA W
labor policy offers a significant protection to agreements
made within a collective bargaining relationship, the courts
have struggled with defining the point at which such protec-
tion must yield to the mandates of antitrust policies.288 The
Second Circuit's apparent conclusion is that the non-
statutory labor exemption protects agreements from antitrust
scrutiny so long as a collective bargaining relationship ex-
ists.28 9 By contrast, the Eighth Circuit imposes additional re-
quirements before federal labor policy demands such protec-
tion." ° While the Supreme Court has not clearly resolved the
issue,29' this comment will analyze the precedent of the three
courts and conclude that the Eighth Circuit's approach gives
appropriate faith and credit to both federal labor and anti-
trust policies.
IV. ANALYSIS
To give proper respect to federal labor law and policy, the
protection of the non-statutory labor exemption must extend
as far as is necessary to "safeguard the 'unique bundle of
compromises' reached by the NFL and the players union" in
their collective bargaining efforts. 92 But, it is also true that
only "certain concerted activity among and between labor and
employers must be held to be beyond the reach of the anti-
trust laws."2 93 To reconcile these two conflicting statements,
situations must exist where the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion does not preempt antitrust scrutiny.294 While the Su-
preme Court has not decided such a case in the context of pro-
fessional sports, its opinion in Brown provides ample support
for the proposition that the non-statutory labor exemption
where there is limited, or no, indication that the party or parties are collectively
bargaining in good faith, there is a risk that antitrust violations will go unpun-
ished. Id.
287. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-36.
288. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.a-c.
289. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.a.
290. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.b.
291. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
292. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Wood v. NBA,
809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987)).
293. Id. at 130 (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)) (emphasis added).
294. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). The Court did reach
antitrust scrutiny after finding that nothing about the non-statutory labor ex-
emption prevented it from doing so.
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should not be applied to all situations involving a collective
bargaining relationship.295
At the conclusion of Justice Breyer's opinion in Brown,
an opinion joined by seven of his fellow Supreme Court jus-
tices, 9 ' he explicitly recognized that in particular circum-
stances, permitting antitrust intervention in a case involving
a collective bargaining relationship would be appropriate. 97
However, wary of trampling into either the authority of the
NLRB or Congress, Justice Breyer ended his opinion without
specifying exactly what those circumstances might be.9
A. The Economic Theories Underlying Broad Statutory
Mandates Must Be Properly Considered Before Applying the
Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Justice Stevens entered into exactly that discussion in a
dissent in Brown that was joined by no other justice.299 While
the dissent of a single justice may carry little weight, it does
offer an argument to consider in deciding cases like Maurice
Clarett's. In drawing an analogy to Justice Holmes's famous
dissent in Lochner v. New York, °° Justice Stevens argued
that it is "equally important ... to be faithful to the economic
theory underlying broad statutory mandates .... ,30 The eco-
nomic theory underlying federal antitrust laws is that by
discouraging concerted action, such as collective bargaining,
optimal price levels can be achieved. 302 The economic theory
underlying federal labor policy is that the use of concerted
action, in the form of collective bargaining, will lead to pro-
tecting optimal wage levels. 03  Taken to their logical ex-
tremes, the economic theories underlying federal antitrust
and labor laws are in direct conflict as to whether or not con-
295. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
296. Id. at 232.
297. Id. at 250.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens recalls Justice Holmes's classic argument that disagreement
with the economic theory embodied in a particular piece of legislation should
not be a factor in the Court's decision as to whether that particular legislation is
constitutional. Brown, 518 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
301. Brown, 518 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 253.
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certed action is a desirable means to achieving a valid end.
The non-statutory labor exemption was created to resolve
this conflict and, as Justice Stevens points out in quoting
Connell Construction, "'requires that some union-employer
agreements be accorded a limited non-statutory exemption
from antitrust sanctions.' 3 °4 If the protection of the non-
statutory labor exemption does apply only in some instances,
and is intended to be a "limited" exemption, it seems more
appropriate to find a particular agreement or provision to be
unlawful unless it is exempt, rather than exempt unless it is
unlawful."5 In placing the burden on the party claiming the
exemption's protection to show that it is merited because it
should be a limited exception,0 6 proper respect is given to
both the theories underlying federal labor and antitrust laws
by allowing for concerted action only where it is clearly shown
that such action is warranted.
1. The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court Take
Justice Stevens's Words to Heart
At issue in Brown was the unilateral implementation by
the NFL of Resolution G-2, a proposal dealing with the crea-
tion of a new developmental squad system for the league.0 7
In accepting the league's unilateral implementation of Reso-
lution G-2, the Court relied on two distinct tests, both of
which demonstrate its concern to be "faithful to the economic
theory underlying broad statutory mandates.""8
The elements of the first test require that the terms of
the challenged provision be "reasonably comprehended within
the employer's preimpasse proposals." 9 This requirement is
typically satisfied where the resulting rule embodies the last
proposal rejected by the objecting party.310 The first test then
requires that the collective bargaining be free of any unfair
304. Id. at 254 (emphasis added) (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)).
305. Brown, 518 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616 (placing the burden of proving that good-
faith collective bargaining had occurred on the proponent of the argument that
it had, in fact, occurred).
307. See Brown, 518 U.S. 231; see also discussion supra Part II.E.2.c.
308. Brown, 518 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
309. Id. (internal citations omitted).
310. Id.
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labor practice 11 and amounts to a requirement that both par-
ties discussed the challenged provision in good faith.312
Drawing from Supreme Court and NLRB precedent, the
above test recognizes that to qualify for the limited non-
statutory exemption from antitrust scrutiny, a challenged
provision must be the product of good faith and documented
collective bargaining efforts. As Justice Stevens cautioned in
his dissent in Brown, the test also requires that the economic
theory on which the non-statutory labor exemption is based
first be respected before antitrust scrutiny is preempted.3 3
Only upon satisfaction of that condition does the test allow
that integral parts of the collective bargaining process pro-
ceed unfettered by the constraints of antitrust scrutiny.314
The cases of Mackey v. NFL311 and Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc."6 are apt examples of how this test respects both anti-
trust and labor law policies, and how it provides labor rela-
tions sufficient breathing room from antitrust scrutiny.
In Mackey, on the one hand, the NFL unilaterally im-
plemented the Rozelle Rule after the players' continued ac-
quiescence.1 7 On the other hand, in Brown, the NFL unilat-
erally implemented Resolution G-2 after the parties had un-
successfully bargained over the exact terms for G-2 for two
months.31 The Eighth Circuit struck the Rozelle Rule in
Mackey,319 while the Supreme Court upheld Resolution G-2 in
Brown.20 The clear distinction between the two cases is the
extent of documented, arms-length, good-faith collective bar-
gaining between the parties.
In Clarett v. NFL, the Second Circuit was unfazed by the
311. Unfair labor practices are defined in the NLRA at section 158(a) and
158(b), and include, for example, the refusal to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a-b) (2000).
312. Brown, 518 U.S. at 238-39.
313. Id at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
314. Id at 239 (citing Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1094 (1979) (describing use of impasse as
a bargaining tactic); Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers
Local 111, 295 N.L.R.B. 607, 609 (1989)).
315. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.b.
316. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.c.
317. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613. The Rozelle Rule was unilaterally imple-
mented by the league in 1963, and remained a part of the league's rules without
contest by the players until 1968.
318. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235.
319. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623.
320. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
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parties' "fail[ure] to wrangle over the eligibility rules at the
bargaining table.""' Consequently, in Clarett's case, it ig-
nored the most basic reason for applying the non-statutory
labor exemption: the promotion of meaningful collective bar-
gaining. 2
The second test the Court utilized in Brown closely mir-
rors the three-pronged "intimately related" approach of Jewel
Tea3 23 and also incorporates the first test's concern for mean-
ingful collective bargaining. Directly incorporating the first
test into its Jewel Tea-like second one, the Court required
sufficient evidence that Resolution G-2 was implemented only
after good-faith collective bargaining on the subject.3 24  The
Court was further satisfied of the merits of applying the non-
statutory labor exemption after finding that Resolution G-2
concerned only parties to that bargaining, but also that Reso-
lution G-2 involved a subject the parties were required to ne-
gotiate collectively.
325
The Court ultimately upheld the NFL's unilateral im-
plementation of Resolution G-2 in Brown, and its approach to
the matter is predictive as to how the Court may decide a
case similar to Maurice Clarett's. Specifically, to properly
defer to the economic theories underlying federal labor and
antitrust laws, the Court's approach views the non-statutory
labor exemption as a limited protection that must be
earned.326
2. The Second Circuit's "Per Se Approach" to the
Application of the Non-Statutory Labor
Exemption
The Second Circuit's opinions in Wood, Caldwell, and
William? 7 demonstrate how its approach deviates from the
321. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142.
322. Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (relying on its opinions in Connell Construction
and Jewel Tea in support of this conclusion).
323. See discussion supra Part II.C.l.a. The intimately related test examines
if the challenged provision concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing, if the challenged provision is intimately related to that mandatory subject,
and, finally, if the challenged provision is the product of bona-fide arms-length
negotiations. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965).
324. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.a.1-3.
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view that the non-statutory labor exemption is a limited pro-
tection that must be earned, and instead presumes its appli-
cation so long as a collective bargaining relationship exists.
In Caidwell, the Second Circuit's opinion revives its fear from
Wood of "'subvert[ing] fundamental principles of our federal
labor policy,"'328 a fear that guided it to rule that Joe Caldwell
had failed to state a claim for relief simply because an "'appli-
cation of antitrust principles to a collective bargaining rela-
tionship would disrupt collective bargaining as we know it.'
329
But the Second Circuit's conclusion cannot be reconciled with
Justice Breyer's statement in Brown that, in certain circum-
stances, applying antitrust principles would not interfere
with the collective bargaining process.3 ° In light of the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Brown, and its implicit revival of its
earlier approach from Jewel Tea,33' it appears that the Second
Circuit's approach is incorrect.
Unfortunately for Maurice Clarett, the Second Circuit
applied the very same per se approach in deciding his case. 2
However, an application of the Supreme Court's approach
from Brown will demonstrate how Maurice Clarett's case
could quite easily have been decided in a different manner.
In such a manner, proper respect is given to both the eco-
nomic theories underlying federal labor and antitrust laws, as
well as to the need to apply the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion as a limitedimmunity from antitrust scrutiny. 333
3. Synthesizing a Limited Role for Application of the
Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's approach from
Brown draws heavily from the "intimately related" and "fol-
low naturally" tests from Jewel Tea and Connell Construc-
tion, respectively." The Court's approach also mirrors the
328. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995) (quot-
ing Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
329. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 530 (quoting NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
330. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
331. Seeid.at 237.
332. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135. The Second Circuit stated that its analyses in
Caldwell, Williams, and Wood were guided by its fear that applying antitrust
suits in sports leagues with collective bargaining relationships "would seriously
undermine many of the policies embodied by... labor laws." Id.
333. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
334. See generally discussion supra Part II.C. l.a-b; the follow naturally test
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Eighth Circuit's opinion in Mackey. 35  This approach also
finds support in the approaches of the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits."' Regardless of which court's approach is used, the es-
sence of the approach is that a number of conditions must be
met before the non-statutory labor exemption applies. 37
These cases do not blindly apply the exemption in all circum-
stances simply because a collective bargaining relationship is
present.38 To do so is to forget Justice Stevens's concern re-
garding proper respect for the economic theories underlying
broad statutory mandates.39 In essence, the non-statutory
labor exemption is a limited exemption that should only be
granted where its proponent can demonstrate that doing so
would be in furtherance of the policies underlying its applica-
tion in the first place.30
In attempting to give proper respect to the economic
theories underlying both labor and antitrust laws, the Su-
preme Court in Jewel Tea examined whether a challenged
agreement was "intimately related" to a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining."' It further analyzed whether the par-
ties primarily affected by the challenged agreement were the
same as those negotiating its terms.342 Finally, the Court as-
from Connell Construction looks to see if the challenged provision was negoti-
ated in the collective bargaining context, if the provision caused any substantial
anticompetitive effects, and if its effects would follow naturally from the elimi-
nation of competition over wages and working conditions; see also supra note
323 (stating the "intimately related test").
335. See generally discussion supra Part II.E.2.b.
336. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391 n.77 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
Cont'l Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council,
817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d
1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979)).
337. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
338. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-2.
339. Brown, 518 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
340. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. The Eighth Circuit only will apply the non-
statutory labor exemption, thereby allowing the labor policy favoring collective
bargaining pre-eminence over the antitrust laws, upon a showing: that the only
parties affected by a challenged provision are the parties to a collective bargain-
ing relationship; that the challenged provision concerns a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining; and that the challenged provision is the product of bona-
fide, arms-length collective bargaining. Id.
341. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90. The Court looked to see if the challenged
provision was "intimately related" to a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing because, upon satisfaction of that condition, the Court would then be as-
sured that the national labor policy underlying the application of the non-
statutory labor exemption was properly respected. Id.
342. Id. The Court held similar concerns that the parties to the challenged
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certained that actual, good-faith bargaining had occurred.3 43
Only upon satisfaction of all three conditions would the Court
apply the non-statutory labor exemption.
In Connell Construction, the Supreme Court applied the
non-statutory labor exemption only after it was convinced
that three distinct conditions had been met.3 The Connell
Construction Court looked for good-faith collective bargain-
ing.3 45  It also examined whether the challenged provision
amounted to a direct restraint with "substantial anticompeti-
tive effects." 46 Finally, the challenged provision could only
cause effects that would "follow naturally" from the elimina-
tion of competition over wages and other working condi-
tions.7"
These two approaches, though dissimilar, exemplify the
Court's sentiment that the non-statutory labor exemption ap-
plies only in limited circumstances. The approaches further
demonstrate that, like the first test from Brown discussed
above,3" the focus in applying the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion is on the specific nature and effect of the collective bar-
gaining efforts and not simply on the presence of a collective
bargaining relationship generally. The Court looks at the
parties affected, the extent and nature of negotiation on the
subject, and the anticompetitive nature of the provision in
general.3" Although named the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion, there is a clear respect for the economic theories under-
lying federal antitrust law in each of the Jewel Tea and Con-
nell Construction approaches. The Jewel Tea approach looks
at the provision's impact on trade, whereas the Connell Con-
struction approach considers the anticompetitive nature of
the challenged provision as one of its elements. 5 ° This re-
provision be the same as those "primarily affected" by it because only with the
identity of the parties being the same could the Court be assured that the na-
tional labor policy favoring good faith collective bargaining was being properly
respected (i.e., that the parties had a chance to voice their respective concerns).
Id.
343. Id.
344. Connell Constr. Co., v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,




348. Brown, 518 U.S. at 238-39.
349. See id.
350. See Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 625; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
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spect demonstrates not only the Court's concern for those un-
derlying economic theories, but also that the proper applica-
tion of the non-statutory labor exemption is to resolve the
natural conflict between labor and antitrust law and not to
allow one to blindly preempt the other.
The Eighth Circuit's approach, as applied in Mackey,35' is
a clear example of the adequacy of the Jewel Tea and Connell
Construction tests in resolving the question of when to apply
the non-statutory labor exemption in the context of profes-
sional sports. Mackey also exemplifies the use of the non-
statutory labor exemption as a limited protection from anti-
trust scrutiny, applied only when "the relevant federal labor
policy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust pol-
icy under the circumstances of the particular case."352 In
striking down the NFL's unilateral implementation of the Ro-
zelle Rule,353 the Eighth Circuit utilized a three-pronged test
resonant of the Supreme Court's opinions in Jewel Tea and
Connell Constrution.
35
Although prongs one and two of the test were satisfied
for the Rozelle Rule, the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the
non-statutory labor exemption because the Rozelle Rule's im-
plementation failed the test's third prong: the parties did not
negotiate at arm's length and in good faith over the Rozelle
Rule prior to its implementation. 5' Recognizing the limited
application of the non-statutory labor exemption, the Eighth
Circuit refused to apply the exemption solely on the ground
that the Rozelle Rule remained part of the NFL's rules be-
cause of the players' acquiescence, rather than because of the
parties' substantive negotiating.3 56 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Eighth Circuit clearly indicated that the non-
statutory labor exemption must be applied only when federal
labor policy truly deserves preeminence over antitrust pol-
icy.357
Both of these considerations, while relevant in labor discussions, are essential
in antitrust analysis.
351. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613.
352. Id. at 613 (citing Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 622; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S.
at 689-90; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)).
353. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
354. Id. at 614.
355. Id. at 615-16.
356. Id. at 616.
357. Id. at 613.
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The Supreme Court in Brown incorporated elements of
Jewel Tea, Connell Construction, and Mackey into its deci-
sion. It looked to see which parties were primarily affected
by the challenged provision, as instructed by Jewel Tea.358 It
inquired into the anticompetitive nature of the provision, as
mandated by Connell Construction.59 And finally, it only ap-
plied the non-statutory labor exemption upon a showing of
sufficient collective bargaining efforts between the parties, as
instructed by Mackey.3' The Court's incorporation of these
tests is clearly intentional, as the reasons for doing so are ex-
plicitly described in the opinion,36' and provides support for
the conclusion that the application of the non-statutory labor
exemption should be limited.
2. Why the Second Circuit's Approach Does Not Comport
with the Proper Application of the Non-Statutory
Labor Exemption-The Supreme Court's Brown
Approach Compared
It ignores the Court's indications entirely to hold, as the
Second Circuit did in Clarett, that the Eighth Circuit's opin-
ion in Mackey does not define the "appropriate limits of the
non-statutory [labor] exemption"362 or that the Jewel Tea /
Connell Construction line of precedent does not "dictate the
appropriate boundaries of the nonstatutory exemption for
cases... [involving] ... a labor market organized around a
collective bargaining relationship."3 3 If the Court were faced
with the facts of Maurice Clarett's case then, its analysis
would likely have mirrored its analysis in those earlier cases
as it did in Brown. An application of the Brown approach to
the facts of Clarett's case shows the merits of doing so and
also illustrates the implications of failing to do so.
Even if the Rule does concern a mandatory subject of col-
lective bargaining, it appears likely that the NFL's Rule
358. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (stating that the parties affected by G-2's im-
plementation were the same employer and employee involved in the collective
bargaining relationship).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 234-35 (noting that the parties negotiated over the terms of G-2,
specifically, from April-June 1989).
361. Id. at 250.
362. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133.
363. Id. at 134.
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would have failed at least two of the other prongs... necessary
to gain the protection of the non-statutory labor exemption.365
Applying the remaining two prongs of Mackey to Clarett's
case, the parties primarily affected by the Rule's application
are arguably Maurice Clarett and the last player selected in
this year's NFL draft.366 If Clarett had been selected, only one
other potential NFL draftee would have lost his opportunity
to be drafted due to the limited number of available draft
slots. Certainly the NFL could argue that the Rule affects its
owners' ability to draft certain players, and the current NFL
players could argue that one player would be displaced from
the league for every Clarett drafted. But these effects are
secondary to the primary effect of the Rule, which is only
Maurice Clarett and the one player whose draft slot he takes.
As Jewel Tea instructs, the relevant inquiry focuses on what
is primarily affected by the challenged provision.367
The Rule also fails Brown's and Mackeys requirement of
a showing that good-faith, arms-length collective bargaining
occurred. This requirement of Brown and Mackey is actually
a statutory requirement of the NLRA. 31' The NLRA's re-
quirement that the parties bargain collectively in good faith
has been interpreted to require a court to look at the parties'
relative bargaining power, whether the terms are or were
unilaterally imposed, whether the terms benefit both sides,
and whether it was ever a "focal point" of the negotiations.6 9
Based on the evidence that was before the court in Clarett's
case, there is nothing that would suggest this NLRA re-
quirement was met.
Initially, the Rule was not even part of the otherwise
"comprehensive" Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the NFLPA and NFLMC"' Instead, it was incorporated into
that agreement by the NFL Constitution and Bylaws in
364. The two remaining prongs of Mackey inquire into: 1) which parties are
primarily affected by the challenged provision and 2) whether or not the parties
have engaged in good faith, arms-length collective bargaining specifically on the
subject matter of the challenged provision.
365. Even where only one prong of the test is not met, a court may properly
refuse to apply the non-statutory labor exemption. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
366. Electronic mail from Michael McCann, Law Professor and Co-counsel
for Maurice Clarett, to Author (July 14, 2004) (on file with author).
367. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
368. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (2000).
369. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
370. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127.
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1992. 37' At that time, the Rule's incorporation into the
Agreement resulted solely from the NFLPA's signature on a
May 6, 1993 letter "'confirm[ing] that the attached documents
are the presently existing provisions of the Constitution and
Bylaws of the NFL referenced in Article IV, Section 2, of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.' ' 72
The only other evidence presented to the district court to
show the extent of collective bargaining over the Rule was the
declaration of Peter Ruocco.373 Peter Ruocco, senior vice
president of Labor Relations at the NFLMC, stated that
"'during the course of collective bargaining that led to the
[collective bargaining agreement], the [challenged] eligibility
rule itself was the subject of collective bargaining.' 374 It is
noteworthy that the district court found this evidence to be
insufficient,37 and it can hardly be called an abuse of discre-
tion for the district court to find that such self-serving state-
ments offered by the NFLMC in support of its own Rule376 are
not sufficient to show good faith collective bargaining.
Further, the Rule was amended in 2003 to incorporate a
1990 memorandum written and implemented solely by the
NFL's commissioner three years before the current Collective
Bargaining Agreement took effect.3 77 There was no evidence
that this amendment was ever discussed by either party. Al-
though the substance of the amendment was minimal, its
unilateral implementation by the NFL furthers the argument
against protecting it from antitrust scrutiny.
Despite this paltry showing 'of collective bargaining on
the Rule, the Second Circuit determined that the non-
statutory labor exemption applied to shield the Rule from an-
371. Id.
372. Id. at 128 (quoting the letter from NFL to the NFLPA (May 6, 1996)).
373. Id.
374. Id. (quoting Declaration of Peter Ruocco at 8, Clarett v. NFL, 306 F.
Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
375. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396. While Clarett failed to submit any evi-
dence to show the Rule was not a subject of good faith collective bargaining, the
"only proof submitted by the NFL strongly suggests that the Rule was never the
subject of collective bargaining between the League and the union, and did not
arise from the collective bargaining process." Id.
376. The district court itself noted this in a footnote, stating that "[t]he NFL
makes much of a side letter dated May 6, 1993. This letter adds nothing to the
record. The letter is from the general counsel of the NFLPA to the attorney for
the NFLMC." Id. at 396 n.110.
377. Id. at 396.
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titrust scrutiny.7 Despite noting the players' "acquiescence"
to the eligibility rules and the failure of the parties to "wran-
gle over the eligibility rules at the bargaining table," the Sec-
ond Circuit was satisfied that sufficient bargaining had oc-
curred.3 79
Refusing to accept the application of Mackey, Jewel Tea,
or Connell Construction,380 the Second Circuit instead relied
on its conclusions in Wood, Caidwell, and Williami" that the
presence of a collective bargaining relationship alone dictates
that only federal labor law will govern. 82 In so doing, the
court failed to give proper faith and credit to the line of the
Court's precedent exemplified by Jewel Tea and Connell Con-
struction, which the Court later applied in Brown. The court
also ignored the general rule, as exemplified by a number of
Supreme Court cases, that the non-statutory labor exemption
is designed to be limited in scope and is only to be applied
where the underlying policies of labor and antitrust laws are
properly respected. 83 Finally, it ignored Justice Breyer's ex-
plicit statement in Brown that certain situations exist where
permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly in-
terfere with the collective bargaining process." The clear
implication of ignoring these holdings is exactly what Justice
Stevens feared the Court had done in Brown: "conflict with
the basic purpose of both the antitrust laws and the national
labor policy" by failing to be "faithful to the economic theory
underlying" those statutory mandates.385
Instead of blindly applying the non-statutory labor ex-
emption in any case involving a collective bargaining rela-
tionship, the economic theories of antitrust law dictate con-
sideration of the anticompetitive effects of the challenged
provision.8  This is not to say that an agreement between an
378. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130.
379. Id. at 142.
380. Id. at 133-34.
381. Id. at 134-35. It is curious to note that the Second Circuit claimed to
also rely on the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown but appears to have ignored
aspects of the decision. Id.
382. Id. at 135.
383. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613 (citing Connell Const., 421 U.S. at 622; Jewel
Tea, 381 U.S. at 682).
384. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
385. Id. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386. See Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 625 (stating that one of the explicit
considerations of the "follow naturally" approach is to consider the substantial
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employer and employee in a collective bargaining relationship
cannot have anticompetitive effects, for federal labor laws
protect such agreements every day."' However, where it is
not evident that the employer-employee agreement in ques-
tion resulted from bona-fide, arms-length negotiating be-
tween those parties, the Supreme Court has determined that
there is room for the application of federal antitrust laws.388
This is particularly relevant for cases like Clarett's, which
involve refusals to deal or group boycotts that have a history
of per se illegality for being blatantly anticompetive. 389  In
those cases, where the non-statutory labor exemption does
not apply, the analysis focuses on the anticompetitive effect of
the challenged provision.3 90
C, The Rule Fails Antitrust Scrutiny
The guidelines of the Supreme Court's opinions in Stan-
dard Oil and Silver are instructive in examining the anticom-
petitive nature of the Rule. Without the protection of the
non-statutory labor exemption, the analysis of the Rule fo-
cuses solely on the potential antitrust violation. The lower
court decisions in Linseman, Deesen, and Denver Rockets
further demonstrate how a restriction similar to the NFL's
Rule should be handled by a court in this situation.39'
The four-part Silver test for an exception to the rule of
per se illegality generally applied to refusals to deal requires
anticompetitive effects of a challenged provision).
387. Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 711).
388. Id. at 250; see Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
389. See, e.g., Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
390. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 n.11.
391. See discussion supraPart II.E.l.a-c. In Linseman, the court held that
the determination of which players should be eligible for the World Hockey As-
sociation ("WHA"), under a free market system, ought to be left up to each indi-
vidual team. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D.
Conn. 1977); see discussion supra Part II.E.l.b. In Deesen, the court held that
the PGA's exclusion of Deesen from PGA tour competition due to poor perform-
ance was a reasonable restraint of trade because procedural safeguards such as
an internal appeals process were in place and the PGA's goal was to increase
competition within the league. Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165, 168-71 (9th Cir.
1966); see discussion supra Part II.E.l.c. In Denver Rockets, the court rejected
the league's justifications for maintaining the four-year rule. Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Mgmt, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (1971), 1066-68. The league's purported
justifications were that the rule was a financial necessity and fulfilled a desire
for athletes to finish their college education, as well as an implicit justification
that it was entitled to a free system for player development. Id; see discussion
supra Part II.E.1.a.
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that an employer's refusal to deal with a particular employee
must meet a number of conditions to survive antitrust scru-
tiny.39 The Silver test inquires whether the particular provi-
sion concerns a subject of legislative mandate, whether it is
consistent with the policies underlying that mandate,
whether it was more extensive than necessary, and, finally,
whether safeguards existed to prevent arbitrary application
of the provision."'
Although the Silver approach was fashioned to address a
non-sports-related conflict, its teachings are on point in a
number of professional sports cases. In Deesen, for example,
the Ninth Circuit found that the PGA's rules survived anti-
trust scrutiny because they promoted competition and pro-
vided safeguards that allowed a player to petition for special
consideration.394 In contrast, in Linseman a Connecticut dis-
trict court failed to protect the WHA's "twenty-year-old rule"
from antitrust scrutiny because the rule was designed pri-
marily to foster the league's own financial interests. 39 Simi-
larly, in Denver Rockets a California district court struck
down the NBA's "four-year rule," finding that the league's
justifications for the rule, while honorable, were inadequate
in a system that provided no means for a player like Spencer
Haywood to petition for special draft consideration.396
Although decided in situations where league and player
relations were not governed by a collective bargaining rela-
tionship, these cases demonstrate appropriate guidelines for
deciding a case like Clarett's. Although a collective bargain-
ing relationship does exist between NFL players and owners,
in the case of the Rule the protection of the non-statutory la-
bor exemption is not warranted. In such a situation, there is
little distinction between a typical refusal to deal case like
Silver and the more factually similar cases of Deesen, Linse-
man, and Denver Rockets. Without the protection of the non-
statutory labor exemption to the Rule, the analysis should
parallel those cases.
1. The Rule Fails to Qualify for the Silver Exception and
392. See discussion supra Part II.A.
393. See discussion supra Part II.A.
394. See discussion supra Part II.E.l.c.
395. See discussion supra Part II.E.l.b.
396. See discussion supra Part II.E.l.a.
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Therefore Should Be Considered an Illegal
Refusal to Deal or Group Boycott
Applying the Silver exception to Clarett's case, it is evi-
dent that the NFL's Rule fails to qualify for its protection.3 97
In making this determination, it is important to first consider
the NFL's proffered justifications for the Rule. The NFL
claimed that the Rule served to: prevent a higher number of
injuries to younger players, prevent member clubs from bear-
ing the cost of such injuries, and prevent younger players
from enhancing their physical conditions by unhealthy
398
means.
Prong three of the Silver analysis inquires into whether
the Rule is no more extensive than necessary to achieve the
NFL's lofty goals.9 Prong four of the Silver analysis ensures
that, in any event, there are adequate safeguards to allow a
particular player to petition for special consideration. 0
As to the NFL's first justification, to prevent injuries to
younger players, there is no guarantee that the Rule in fact
protects that goal. Maurice Clarett is six feet tall and weighs
approximately 230 pounds.40' Three recent Hall of Fame-
caliber NFL running backs, which Clarett aspires to be, were
smaller and lighter than Clarett. °2 Further, as the district
court noted, restrictions based solely on height or weight are
poor proxies for "NFL-readiness."4 3 The district court also
took notice of the fact that the NFL and its owners already
had an opportunity to evaluate younger players' "NFL-
readiness" via a number of physical and mental examinations
given to all entering players.04 As Silver instructs, the chal-
397. Prongs one and two, not relevant to this portion of the discussion, are:
whether or not the subject matter of the challenged provision is a subject of
legislative mandate; and whether or not the challenged provision is consistent
with the policies underlying that mandate. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341
(1963).
398. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
399. See discussion supra Part II.A.
400. See discussion supra Part II.A.
401. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 410.
404. Id. at 410 n.195. Potential draft picks are subjected to extensive physi-
cal, medical, and psychological testing. Id. "Each of the players that attend the
NFL's annual draft combines-where prospective draftees are evaluated by the
teams-are subjected to a battery of physical examinations, psychological pro-
files, and interviews." Vic Carucci, Combine Still Critical to Evaluating Talent
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lenged provision should be no more extensive than necessary
to achieve the proponent's stated end.4 °5 Where it is clear that
the NFL's concern for the physical and mental preparedness
of entering players is already addressed elsewhere, there is
little reason to uphold an additional restriction that only
serves to decrease competition in the league.
The NFL's second justification for the Rule, to limit the
cost of injuries to smaller, less mature players, is similarly
faulty and could be addressed by less extensive means. There
is no guarantee that younger players are smaller or are any
less prepared to compete in the NFL. Furthermore, the
NFL's concern over hiring players who are not physically ca-
pable of competing in the league is addressed elsewhere.0 6
Finally, as Linseman instructs, the NFL's desire to limit its
costs is not a valid reason to uphold an otherwise anticom-
petitive justification. 7
The NFL's third justification for the Rule, to prevent
younger players from utilizing unhealthy performance-
enhancing methods, can be dismissed with similar ease. Al-
though laudable, the justification is unrelated to promoting
competition. In fact, it has more to do with a general concern
for the welfare of the younger players. Presumably, the test-
ing methods described above4 8 would address the NFL's con-
cern in a far less anticompetitive fashion. However com-
mendable this desire may be, as the district court noted in
Denver Rockets, neither the courts nor the NFL are in a posi-
tion to say that "this consideration should override the objec-
tive of fostering economic competition which is embodied in
the antitrust laws. If such a determination is to be made, it
must be made by Congress and not the courts."40 9
Having dispensed with the NFL's proffered justifications
for the Rule as being anticompetitive and without support, it
(Feb. 18, 2003), at http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/6197027 (last visited Oct. 8,
2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
405. See discussion supra Part II.A.
406. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410 n.195; see also supra note 404. Gener-
ally, all entering players participate in pre-draft camps where the teams are
able to view the players and assess their "NFL-readiness." Clarett, 306 F.
Supp. 2d at 410 n.195. Based on that system, a player who is not "NFL-ready"
would have a significantly reduced chance of ever being drafted and an even
smaller chance of ever participating in a real game. Id.
407. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322.
408. See supra note 404.
409. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
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is also worth noting that the NFL provides no means by
which a player like Maurice Clarett could petition for special
consideration under prong four of the Silver exception. The
Supreme Court in Silver noted the importance of providing
such an avenue, 410 and the PGA's example in Deesen demon-
strates how such a review could operate in the realm of pro-
fessional sports.41' Since potential draftees undergo a series
of performance-related tests prior to being drafted,412 there is
a built-in opportunity for such a petition or review process to
occur. If an otherwise eligible draftee is ultimately not
drafted by an NFL team because of Maurice Clarett's
stronger performance during one of those tests, it would only
serve to promote competition in the league and thereby ad-
dress the primary concern of federal antitrust laws.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Clarett v. NFL deviates
from the Supreme Court's approach in Brown, and rejects the
applicability of the Court's opinions in Jewel Tea and Connell
Construction or the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Mackey. In
doing so, the Second Circuit applied the non-statutory labor
exemption nearly "per se" simply because the parties were
engaged in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship. But
this application ignores the very purpose of the non-statutory
labor exemption in allowing for "a proper accommodation be-
tween the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining
under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free
competition in business markets [by requiring] that some un-
ion-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory
exemption from antitrust sanctions.4 1' It also precludes the
applicability of federal antitrust laws in a case where, in all
likelihood, those laws should have been applied.
V. PROPOSAL
Although grounded in the facts of Clarett, this proposal
could theoretically be applied to any case involving the inter-
section of federal labor and antitrust laws. National labor
policy favors free and meaningful collective bargaining.414 To
410. Silver, 373 U.S. at 361-62.
411. See discussion supra Part II.E.l.c.
412. See Carucci, supra note 404.
413. Brown, 518 U.S. at 254 (emphasis supplied).
414. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996) (internal citations
omitted).
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promote that policy, the courts have developed a non-
statutory labor exemption, allowing certain labor practices to
be exempted from antitrust scrutiny."' The courts have
struggled to determine the boundaries of the exemption, and
more specifically, when its application is not warranted. This
comment has considered the approach of both the Second and
Eighth Circuits, as well as that of the Supreme Court, in
making such determinations.416
While the Supreme Court has never faced a case quite
like Maurice Clarett's, there is considerable support in other
decisions of the Court to predict how it might decide such a
case."' There is also ample support in the Court's decisions
for the proposition that certain circumstances exist where,
despite the presence of an ongoing collective bargaining rela-
tionship, the application of the non-statutory labor exemption
is not warranted.4 8
A. In Applying the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption, a Court
Should Only Do So Where the Underlying Economic Theories
Behind it are Clearly Respected
This proposal calls for the Court, and all other courts, to
consider the concern of Justice Stevens in his dissent in
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.4"9 Where a law finds its source in
a particular economic or other theory, that theory should be
respected to the fullest extent possible.4 0 Federal labor rela-
tionships have been given a degree of protection from the
courts' scrutiny by the operation of the non-statutory labor
exemption. 21 But the scope of the exemption is properly lim-
ited.42 The limits on the exemption need not be exactly de-
fined, but they can be broadly interpreted so as to respect the
reasons for the exemption in the first place.
B. Before Applying the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in a
415. Id.
416. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 237 (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 711 (1965)).
422. See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 238.
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Particular Case, a Court Should First Undertake a Factual
Inquiry Sufficient to Determine the Nature and Extent of
Collective Bargaining Efforts on the Subject Matter of the
Challenged Provision
The non-statutory labor exemption promotes the opera-
tion of meaningful arms-length collective bargaining efforts
by affording the fruits of such efforts a limited protection
from otherwise applicable antitrust laws.423 But where such
bargaining efforts do not occur, or where the proponent of a
challenged provision can only offer limited proof of such bar-
gaining, the presumption must lean in favor of not applying
the exemption. Where meaningful collective bargaining has
occurred, no problem exists. Where meaningful collective
bargaining may have occurred, the burden should be on the
party claiming its occurrence to prove it. To allow otherwise
is to blindly permit the operation of a limited protection at
the expense of jeopardizing the effect of federal antitrust law.
This is not, and should never be, the proper application of the
non-statutory labor exemption.
Courts should take note of the proof of collective bargain-
ing efforts presented to them before deciding to apply the
non-statutory labor exemption. When sufficient proof to show
that such efforts have occurred is lacking, courts are in their
right to apply federal antitrust laws and a "rule of reason"
analysis.4 This is not judicial legislation, nor is it the usurp-
ing of National Labor Relations Board or congressional func-
tions; it simply represents the courts' efforts to "be faithful to
the economic theory underlying broad statutory mandates."4 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2004 NFL draft has come and gone, and Maurice
Clarett was forced to watch it from the sidelines. With his
professional football career on hiatus for the immediate fu-
ture, Clarett is left to consider other pursuits.4 26
423. Id. at 237 (citing Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 622; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S.
at 711).
424. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
425. Brown, 518 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
426. It appears that Clarett will be eligible for the April 2005 draft, although
he will probably be drafted in a lower round and paid less than he would have
been had the court decided to allow him to enter the previous draft. Running
Back's Stock May Drop, if He Even Gets Drafted, MSNBC News, at
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Looking beyond Clarett v. NFL,427 the implications of the
Second Circuit's analysis in that case are disheartening. The
opinion ignores a long line of Supreme Court precedent, in-
cluding Jewel Tea and Connell Construction, on the applica-
tion of the non-statutory labor exemption that the Court itself
applied in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.428 The opinion further
rejects the Eighth Circuit's approach in Mackey v. NFL, an
approach at least implicitly recognized by the Court in
Brown.429 In doing so, the Second Circuit instead strongly
adheres to its own line of precedent, comprised of cases such
as Caldwell v. ABA, NBA v. Williams, and Wood v. NBA.43 °
However, the danger of adhering to this line of precedent is
that it allows for the blanket application of the non-statutory
labor exemption in any case where a collective bargaining re-
lationship is present, without properly considering some of
the factors that may counsel against application.
This comment has explored a number of instances where
the blanket application of the non-statutory labor exemption
is improper."' This comment has further explored how in
such cases lower court antitrust decisions like Deesen v. PGA,
Linseman v. WHA, and Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Manage-
ment, Inc. become relevant and offer sufficient guidance of
how such cases should be decided." 2 These lower court deci-
sions, as interpretations of the Supreme Court's analysis in
Silver v. NYSE and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, focus
433
entirely on general antitrust concerns.
But the analysis in a case like Clarett v. NFL only
reaches antitrust questions after it has been determined that
the non-statutory labor exemption does not apply. This com-
ment has explored the question of when antitrust analysis
becomes relevant in a case like Clarett v. NFL, and concludes
that, in reaching the antitrust analysis in such a case, proper
respect has been given to both the economic theories underly-
ing federal labor and antitrust laws.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6465636/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2004).
427. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
428. See discussion supra Part IV.
429. See discussion supra Part IV.
430. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.a.
431. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.E.2.b.
432. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
433. See discussion supra Part II.E. 1.
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